


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Deterrence in Indo-Pak Context

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Book Review
By
MAJID MEHMOOD

George Perkovich and Toby Dalton,
Not War, Not Peace? Motivating
Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border
terrorism (Oxford University Press,

New Delhi 2016), 297

The book titled “*Not War, Not Peace? Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border terrorism*” co-authored by George Perkovich and Toby Dalton is a thorough analysis of policy options available to India and their feasibility in dealing with cross border terrorism generating from Pakistan. The book is also about how Indian calibration of the policy options may motivate or compel Pakistani policy makers to end their proxy war against India. The title of the book “*Not War, Not Peace?*” describes the complex relationship between Pakistan and India, two nuclear armed rivals, as it exists today. In the authors’ perceptions, limited wars under nuclear overhang and coercive compellence, instead of give and take bargaining, are very much part of policy milieu in India and Pakistan. Will these policies achieve their desired objectives is what the question mark in the title suggests. The authors have taken a position in the title about Pakistan being a source of terrorism inside India which reads “*Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border terrorism*” and have built the argument forward from this baseline.

The book contains six chapters each detailing a single policy option available to India. The chapters link up with the broader theme of book’s title “*Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border terrorism*”. The cost benefit analysis and issues related to real Indian capabilities, as opposed to projected capabilities, to achieve policy ends vis a vis Pakistan are succinctly analyzed in each chapter. The authors conclude that an appropriate mixture of violent and non-violent strategies coupled with domestic Indian reforms in defense and intelligence sector will enable India to address its most important foreign policy challenge: Pakistan.

In the first chapter titled 'decision making setting' the authors argue that Indian strategic decision making system needs significant reforms against problems like defense procurement, lack of military input in defense planning and inter-services rivalry. Indian leaders, the authors argue, should also enhance their understanding of Pakistan, its interests and the decision making process. Moreover, without a deep understanding of Pakistani motivations it will not be able to address its Pakistan challenge.

Second chapter explains the feasibility and impact of Indian land based operations or proactive operations in deterring Pakistan against using terrorism as a policy instrument. The authors argue that India has several problems with the large scale land operations both conceptually as envisioned in the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) as well as politically. This doctrine struggles to answer an important question as to how these land operations will motivate Pakistan to demobilize the India centric terrorist groups. Several operational deficiencies in the Cold Start Doctrine and interplay of nuclear factor and Pakistani responses are discussed in this chapter in detail.

Third chapter of the book analyses impact of use of airpower, specifically in the form of limited air strikes against alleged terrorist training camps in Pakistan, to motivate and compel Pakistan to rein in anti-India groups within. Authors are skeptical about achieving the desired Indian objective while using air power as a stand alone option. Moreover technical, institutional and operational impediments within Indian Air force are explained in detail. Authors are of the opinion that the option of limited air strikes may turn domestic public opinion in favor of Indian government but the larger strategic objectives vis a vis Pakistan will not be achieved. The chapter also details the problem of real time deficiencies of Indian intelligence capabilities in identifying terrorist targets in Pakistan for elimination by air strikes.

Perkovich and Dalton doubt that US and Israeli models of eliminating their enemies via air strikes would be workable for India due to near parity with Pakistan in military domain. Moreover, the authors are of the view that US and Israeli model even though successful in surgical elimination of their enemies at tactical level has failed to produce a strategic effect of winning the larger conflict.

The chapter on using covert intelligence operations to demobilize anti-India groups based in Pakistan comprehensively describes all facets of covert operations, their limits and potential benefits if aligned with the larger foreign policy framework. The authors concede that it is almost impossible to measure Indian covert capabilities through public sources. The chapter traces the evolution of Indian covert operations capabilities under the political guidance of successive Indian governments from 1990's onwards. Some insightful interviews by former high ranking Indian officials gives the impression that Indian covert operations infrastructure has seen both extremes since the Gujral administration i.e. total shutdown and raising capabilities for offensive actions abroad from scratch.

The book expounds the view that success and failures of covert operations have not ended its utility around the globe and the test for statecraft is how well it can bargain with its adversary by leveraging the pressure generated through covert operations abroad.

Chapter five titled '*nuclear capabilities*' assesses potential changes India could make in the nuclear doctrine and force posture in order to complement its army and air centric operations to achieve twin objectives of compelling Pakistan to abandon proxy warfare and secondly prevent Pakistan from escalating conflict in the event of large scale Indian military operations. The authors are of the view that existing Indian nuclear doctrine may not be suitable to cater for land operations inside Pakistan and it could consider adopting *limited nuclear options* to counter Pakistan's use of battlefield tactical nuclear weapons. If India decides on the limited nuclear options, the authors argue, it will need significant institutional and operational changes which India lacks currently.

The Last chapter of book discusses non-violent compellence measures such as use of diplomatic pressure, soft power projection, information campaign, naval blockade and sanctions to compel Pakistan to change course vis a vis India. Perkovich and Dalton conclude that '*Not War, Not Peace*' will be a foreseeable future of India –Pakistan relations.

The book's strength is that it extensively quotes from the interviews of recently retired Indian and Pakistani officials who have an experience in

dealing with issues discussed. Moreover, each chapter is comprehensive enough to cover a particular issue with a certain policy approach as seen from an Indian angle. The language is simple and arguments are easy for ordinary reader to comprehend. Authors have tried to explain some concepts, where possible, before initiating a larger policy debate based on those explanations.

The book's weakness is lack of a theoretical framework that could have helped the reader understand the book's title and policy issues discussed. Several issues can be raised about the book based on this observation.

For instance, would it be prudent to limit India's Pakistan problem to merely terrorism believed to be originating from Pakistan? Indeed India's Pakistan challenge encompasses much more than what the authors envision. India's Pakistan problem actually revolves around Pakistan military's war fighting potential and resultantly its ability to block and frustrate India's regional plans. The policy options discussed in the book, specifically India's land, air and nuclear based military operations and diplomatic pressures, which will ultimately affect Pakistan's military war fighting potential. The authors have rightly argued about the possibility of such undertakings.

Moreover, the book does not explain what exactly is meant when the authors use the terms like "demobilizing anti-India groups" or "motivating Pakistan to prevent cross border terrorism". These terms can have multiple meanings and impacts on Indian policy thinking if a certain definition is adopted by it. For example, since the time of Pervaiz Musharraf till date the anti-India groups in Pakistan have been dormant and have kept a low profile in terms of their operations in Indian held Kashmir. These groups have either converted themselves to humanitarian organizations while others have simply been lying low. Knowledgeable Indians appreciate a significant drop in cross LoC infiltration since 2004 as opposed to pre-2001 era. The point is whether India, in terms of policy consideration, wants the preservation of the militant status quo or would like Pakistan to move further against such groups? This distinction is missing in the book.

Other issues in the book also merit more attention. For instance, regarding discussion of India's land based operation against Pakistan, whether cold start military doctrine is really as defensive as proclaimed by Indians? What

if, in a future war, Pakistan occupies more important territory than India? In such a plausible scenario war objectives of India may change towards destroying Pakistan's war potential and will no longer be limited to eliminating perceived Pakistani support to terrorism. Resultantly, mutual bargaining for war termination will be an overarching goal rather than terrorism which itself will be a complex issue.

Similarly, regarding the employment of limited airstrikes coupled with movement of some Indian troops along the border may be desired by Indians as escalation dominance but the perceptions across the border will differ. How would the weakening of Pakistan's war fighting potential help India to compel Pakistan to move against anti-India groups, if that is the real Indian objective?

The question what will transpire after a first nuclear use and unknown consequences and trajectory of conflict is discussed in detail in the discussion about nuclear options. The issue that requires more deliberation is how India's adoption of '*limited nuclear options*' will enhance Indian deterrence against Pakistan? It is noteworthy that trajectory of war will determine escalatory dynamics and war termination conditions. Escalation dynamics cannot be separated from these factors and the larger political objectives of war.

Perkovich and Dalton could have dwelt on impact of nuclear weapons in limiting the threat of war and how can this potentially effect bargaining positions of both India and Pakistan.

Though the book adds little in terms of offering a new policy conversation, as seen from an Indian angle, but it still raises some new issues which will be deliberated upon and analyzed at both academic and official levels. Especially within the context of ongoing crisis in Indian held Kashmir, the Uri attack and Indian and Pakistani responses and future trajectory, assumptions and the substance of this book will be tested. This is why this book must be read and thoroughly analyzed.

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Book Review
By
SAJID AZIZ

Alex Vatank, *Iran and Pakistan: Security, Diplomacy and American Influence* (New York: I.B Tauris, 2015), 304.

Iran and Pakistan relations have had some distinct characteristics over the last six decades. Unlike India and Afghanistan, Iran does not have contested borders with Pakistan, but their bilateral relationship is marred by geopolitical rivalry, economic disconnect and deep distrust of each other. Their rhetoric of shared cultural history going centuries back is contrasted to the diametrically opposed political outlooks on contemporary security and regional issues. The era of cooperation during the Shah's era when Iran and Pakistan were both part of Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and their shared strategic interests of containing 'communist expansion' after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, was followed by a zero-sum game in Afghanistan, which still, in a more moderate form, continues. The most concrete manifestations of these features of their bilateral relationship are the partially successful visit of President Rouhani to Pakistan, tripartite trade agreement between Iran, India and Afghanistan, bypassing Pakistan and more importantly the failure of both states to open a new page after the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA) commonly known as Iran nuclear deal and the subsequent lifting of sanctions on Iran.

Alex Vatanka, a Senior fellow at the the Middle East Institute and Jamestown Foundation in Washington, in his book *Iran and Pakistan: Security, Diplomacy and American Influence*, captures all these aspects of Pakistan-Iran relations. But more importantly Vatanka discusses these issues in the larger geopolitical context, regional situation and the role of outside powers generally and American influence particularly. Expanded over ten chapters, the book covers the history of Pak-Iran bilateral relations from 1959 when Pakistan and Iran signed the 'Friendship Treaty' to the contemporary period. Written in crisp prose, the chronological order of events is interspersed with insightful analyses that take into account not only the overlapping of security challenges, threat perceptions of both the states and the geopolitics of that era but also factors in the role of leadership at the helm of affairs that shaped the policies of the respective states.

Vatanka considers the period from 1949 till the Iranian revolution in 1979 as one of cooperation. The regional turbulence and 'communist threat' and their tilt towards America combined to make both Iran and Pakistan become part of Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Iran stood by Pakistan during the wars of 1965 and 1971. Moreover after the imposition of arms embargo by America, Pakistan looked towards Iran as a conduit for arms to meet its security challenges. Shah also rejected Sardar Daoud's claims of greater Pushtunistan and raised the issue of western Afghanistan, which had once been part of Persian empire to neutralize Afghan premier's irredentist claims on some Pakistani territory. In order to promote regional connectivity and boost trade, Pakistan, Iran along with Turkey launched Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) in 1964. It failed to achieve its desired outcomes but in subsequent years it would become the hippy trail.

The watershed event, according to the author, in the bilateral relationship came in the form of Iranian revolution under the religious leader, Imam Khomeini as he is referred to in Iran. Khomeini withdrew Iran from CENTO and his notion of exporting the revolution ruffled many a feather in its neighbouring countries. Gen. Zia ul Haq, who had deposed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, supported sectarian groups to counter what he considered Iran's attempt to export its revolution in Pakistan. He instituted policies like making zakat compulsory on all citizens, that further vitiated the social stability and exacerbated sectarianism in Pakistan. Though all was not honky-dory between Iran and Pakistan, but the regional turbulence and geopolitics provided them enough opportunities to work together. Both Iran and Pakistan opposed Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and supported the resistance forces against the Soviet forces. Moreover, the revolution in Iran and the subsequent hostage crisis led to severing of Iran's diplomatic relations with America and then imposition of arms embargo and sanctions on Iran. During the Iraq-Iran war, a significant part of Iranian arms imports from China and North Korea came through Pakistani ports.

This convergence on Afghanistan was followed by a zero-sum game after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Iran and Pakistan put their weight behind different factions, jockeying for power involved in an internecine war after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Iran and Pakistan have for quite some time traded accusations, blaming each other of supporting

militant groups and providing them sanctuaries. Iran has accused that the Sunni sectarian groups fighting against Iranian government are based in Pakistani Balochistan and take refuge there after launching attacks on Iranian security guards. Pakistan counters these accusations and says since it faces a greater security threat from its eastern border and its forces are deployed in tribal areas of Pakistan, it can not commit sufficient number of troops to monitor the long border with Iran.

Vatanka's book is a fine contribution to the discourse on bilateral relations between Iran and Pakistan. His meticulous research, his access to some of the official documents and government memos and his analytical prowess add to the value of the book. His objective analysis of the issues that mar bilateral relationship between Iran and Pakistan, and their impact on economic disconnect and distrust of each other, make gripping reading. Though the time period it covers extends to over six decades, the author tries to cover all the significant political developments between the two countries. But at times it seems the fast-paced narrative to cover all issues undermines a deeper analysis of certain significant developments.

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Book Review
By
Muhammad Faisal

John Mueller, *Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism To Al-Qaeda* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 319

Dawn of nuclear age set in an 'obsession' with nuclear weapons leading to charting of unwise policies with potentially destructive consequences. Historical record, of past decades, informs us that, the US policy-makers and their allies in the scientific community have exaggerated destructive abilities of the bomb. Yet, nuclear weapons have not been the cause of historical events during the Cold War and in subsequent years. Impact of nuclear weapons and the technology have in fact been mostly 'irrelevant' in the larger framework of international system, yet they have had deep influence in shaping thinking of the policymakers. And, it, argues John Mueller, is the ultimate dogma that has held the US nuclear policy hostage for over fifty years.

Divided into three sections, spread over fifteen chapters, *Atomic Obsession* deconstructs several myths and assumptions associated with impact of nuclear weapons on policy making, spread of nuclear technology and possibilities of nuclear terrorism. The author examines the fundamental belief systems underpinning the nuclear-arms enterprise in some detail. Without mincing words, Mueller, is of the view that destructive power of nuclear weapons have been vastly exaggerated. Their role in his opinion in bringing, an end to World-War II was insignificant as Germany had already surrendered and Japan would have surrendered in few weeks; and, the US and Soviet Union exhausted from the Second World War would never have gone to another war even in the absence of nuclear deterrence.

The author also terms arms-control agreements concluded between Moscow and Washington at the height of Cold War, as an eyewash and total waste of time. More starkly, he asserts threat of nuclear proliferation is also greatly inflated. And, the very means used to prevent proliferation of nuclear arms i.e., economic and military sanctions, and political isolation drive countries to develop a nuclear deterrent capability. Moreover, he considers, the prospects of a terrorist group getting hands on a nuclear bomb, or fissile materials or associated paraphernalia "vanishingly small".

At a more abstract level, Mueller, argues that nuclear weapons are far insignificant as threats and, more as deterrents than has been theorized by academics and believed by policy-practitioners. Under-cutting the predominant belief, he asserts that atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki didn't force Japan to surrender, but it was Soviet declaration of war on Japan that did. During Cold War, Moscow and Washington had an inherent interest in avoiding war, which kept the peace, not the 'balance of terror', as claimed by nuclear optimists. Washington sought to apply nuclear deterrence to deter Soviet Union from doing what it had no intention of doing. In the process US spent more than \$5 trillion on its nuclear-arms. In the post-Cold War era, that bloated nuclear arsenal has been rendered 'useless'.

Similarly, from a military standpoint, nuclear weapons have been operationally unfeasible, primarily because of an inability to choose suitable targets, or the ones, that couldn't be attacked effectively through conventional means. Then why use nuclear weapons? Moreover, nuclear factor drastically increases the escalation spiral, constraining the decision-makers' ability to manipulate the risk, as they would have done with smart usage of conventional armaments.

Yet, nuclear weapons and technology have had a substantial influence on arms races, deterrence, non-proliferation efforts countering nuclear terrorism, and above all, diplomatic engagement with potential nuclear aspirants. The quest to check the spread of nuclear weapons technology has led to 'unwise and destructive' policies. To check proliferation, the US threatens those seeking nuclear arms. Iran and North Korea feel threatened, thus, they embarked on a quest to build nuclear technology. China, the author claims, had developed nuclear weapons because it felt threatened by the US. Thus, in a piece of advice which Washington is definitely not going to heed, Mueller asserts, stop 'threatening countries' if you want to promote non-proliferation. Great powers like Russia, China and developing nations also posit the same argument, while US continues to ignore it.

Mueller's analysis appears provocative and convincing at the same time. It comes as a breath of fresh air amidst the mainstream academic and policy discourse. He forces the reader to question the inherent tenets of the nuclear theories and deterrence precepts. A question, not addressed by him is, if

nuclear weapons are that irrelevant, as he argues, then, how can fear of their destructive capabilities lead to pursuit of such unwise policies? Despite little real consequential impact on historical events, crises and international politics have progressed under a nuclear shadow for past seven decades. Third world war did not break out, but, presence of nuclear weapons has had an impact on the course of relations among nations and great powers, in turn influencing international political system.

Another complexity in regard to such issues is determining causality. It is far easier to explain why an event took place, then understanding why it didn't. Granted, the US nuclear policy has suffered from threat inflation and exaggeration of utility of nuclear weapons besides proliferation potential have led to costly policy choices. Realistically, the chances of actual use of nuclear weapons, any where in the world have remained minimal, and the threat of nuclear terrorism is actually overstated. Yet, the policy dilemma is that all these are of low probability, but potentially devastating impact. In our complex international system, occurrence of such high-impact events cannot be ruled out. What do policy-makers do when such low probability events happen? This has also forced Chinese policy-makers to explore responses to a nuclear emergency contingency in the neighborhood due to domestic instability.

Nonetheless, *Atomic Obsession* is one of those books which challenges the mainstream discourse. Fifteen chapters of scholarship and deep policy analysis through decades of research makes the book a valuable addition to literature on nuclear policy and deterrence. Divided in short chapters, concise paragraphs comprising pithy sentences, the book makes engaging reading. Mueller convincingly questions the scared truths of nuclear policy, deterrence, proliferation, and threat of nuclear terrorism. It is for these reasons that the book is a must-read for leaders making decisions involving nuclear weapons, policy-practitioners, academics, and students of nuclear weapons policy around the world.

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CISS Insight Guideline for Contributors

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CISS was established in October 2010 and has embarked on a challenging task, that of promoting a better understanding of international strategic issues pertaining to our region, both in Pakistan and abroad. We feel that there is a need now, more than ever before, for objective and impartial analyses and assessment of international issues from a Pakistan perspective.



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