Before the overt nuclearization of South Asia in 1998, three major wars between India and Pakistan highlighted the latter’s struggle to bridge the conventional imbalance. During this time, Pakistan’s latent nuclear capability provided an effective deterrent, which served to offset the conventional and nuclear threats from India. However, twenty years since India’s entrance into the nuclear club, followed by Pakistan, conventional deterrence remains integral to the maintenance of strategic stability in South Asia. In view of these developments, this article aims to analyze Pakistan’s strategic direction since the nuclear tests, particularly in terms of its conventional military capabilities.
This article was published in the South Asian Voices on December 7, 2018. To read the full article please follow the link below.
Maimuna Ashraf is currently working as a Research Fellow at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) Islamabad, Pakistan. She focuses on South Asian nuclear issues, primarily India and Pakistan’s nuclear missile capabilities, conventional and nuclear military doctrines, postures and multilateral export control regimes. She can be reached at firstname.lastname@example.org