On September 24, 2025, following the North Korea, and Russia, India has launched its new missile force by testing Agni Prime from a rail-based mobile launcher. According to India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh on X, “this successful flight test has put India in the group of ‘select nations’ having capabilities that have developed canisterised launch system from on the move rail network.†Now, this development places India in the list with North Korea and Russia. With the recent consecutive missile tests and ongoing threats of continuation of Operation Sindoor by Indian military personnel and politicians – after the India’s defeat in India-Pakistan four-day military confrontation in May 2025– have reignited fears of renewed Indian military escalation and adventurism in the region.
India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) confirmed the Agni Prime test from a rail-based mobile launcher system. According to DRDO, the test was conducted in coordination with India’s Strategic Forces Command (SFC). The missile was integrated into a modified rail boxcar equipped with an extendable platform designed to elevate the launcher above overhead electrical wires – a feature noted by several observers and critiques. This level of engineering shows India’s intent to make its deterrent forces mobile, concealed, and survivable. The Agni-Prime also known as Agni-P is intended for a range between 1,000 and 2,000 kilometers approximately around 621 and 1,243 miles. DRDO stated that the missile is also deployable from road-mobile launchers. It remains unclear whether Agni-P will replace or supplement earlier Agni-series missiles such as Agni-I with a range of 700 kilometers, and Agni-II with a range of 2,000 kilometers. The rail-based version comprises a containerized Agni-P missile, an autonomous launch capability, advance communication systems, and unrevealed safety characteristics. Though this technology also increased the complexity of tracking and verification.
For clarity, India is not the first country to test a missile from a rail-base launcher. In the midst of Cold War, the USSR tested a rail-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), known as the RT-23 Molodets. Russia later sought to revive this technology through the Barguzin project but eventually abandoned it to concentrate on the Avangard hypersonic missile. Later, North Korea introduced the “railway mobile missile system,†in September 2021 with India now joining the list of states pursuing rail-based missile systems.
In a glance, the strategic implications of the rail-based launcher will have a huge strategic turf for India i.e. roughly 40,000 miles inside the country. This will allow missiles to be fired timely from anywhere inside the 2000 km radius on the railway tracks also by disguise it in regular passenger wagon. It may become difficult to identify, monitor and intercept for Pakistan such as in 11.2 km long tunnel of Pir Punjal in Indian administered Kashmir. The rail tunnels may provide shelters as bunkers for these missile launchers in the time of conflict. It will be harder to encounter them by increasing the survivability rate of these missiles. these features shorten decision time and increase the risk of escalation and miscalculation by putting the regional peace in threat. Additionally, the Agni-P can reach deep into Pakistan with a maximum range of about 2,000 kilometers. Rail mobility multiplies the number of possible launch positions and targets inside Pakistan.
On the contrary, Pakistan has always emphasized restraint and shown a responsible management of its conventional and nuclear forces. For example, the recent introduction of the Pakistan’s Army Rocket Force Command is a step toward clearer force structure and mission separation. That command aims to separate conventional and nuclear roles by reducing ambiguity. This could eliminate chances of miscalculations or crisis escalations in the region.
However, India has, a mixed record on technology, deployment and safety. Incidents such as the BrahMos malfunction in March 2022 and other military accidents have shown risks in deployment and training. Also, India’s recent stress on compellence by using show of force to coerce its neighbor’s behavior results in regional and global tension. Compellence strategies can break down deterrence logic if applied recklessly. The result is peril for Pakistan, the neighborhood, and the wider international community. For stability, states must choose restraint and clarity over coercion. In fact, now, India fabricates continuation of Operation Sindoor for future wars. The test of Agni-P is one of the ring of chain in the recent chain of missile tests. Defence Minister Singh’s statements signal faster tri-service integration, real-time Command, Control, Computer, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) by raising the risk of military escalation for Pakistan. For Pakistan, Indian military technological advancements such as Agni-P create shortening decision cycles and increasing the speed of Indian coercive options. Such advancements are merely threat of crisis escalation in the near future. In conclusion, the Agni-P test mirrors India’s rising interest of advanced delivery systems while underestimating the fragile geographical realities and security conditions of South Asia. The timing of the Agni Prime test – just months after the conflict – suggests a threat of incoming Indian hostility. In such circumstances, political and diplomatic engagements can reduce tensions. At the same time, confidence-building measures are essential to cut the inadvertent escalation and risk of misperception. A few practical measures would reduce entanglement risks. First, India and Pakistan could negotiate a mutual pledge to avoid offensive strikes against clearly identified strategic bases in peacetime avoiding civilian casualties. Second, both sides could exchange technical data about launcher types, range bands, and payload options. Such transparency would reduce dangerous ambiguity in the future. Third, India could also introduce a distinct command which will separate nuclear and conventional systems. Clear separation makes the entanglement of conventional and nuclear systems less likely and thus lowers the chance of inadvertent escalation.
This article was published in another form at https://ipi.org.pk/agni-prime-unlocking-the-south-asian-crisis-instability/
Mr Muhammad Ali Baig is Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.
