Introduction
Since the end of the four-day May 2025 conflict between India and Pakistan, threat of an arms race looms large over South Asia. India is growing its missile inventory, showing a doctrinal shift towards counterforce preemption and seeking punitive military actions under the nuclear hangover. The development and retesting of its missile arsenal demonstrate a predilection towards pushing the region towards an arms race.
One surprising element drawn from the May clash is that the four-day conflict has impacted far beyond operational and tactical levels up to the strategic and technological levels. The escalation went beyond their thinking, and upon Pakistan’s response, they requested a ceasefire. So, the missile gap exposed the credibility of their deterrence. The fierce missile expedition is to fill the gap in their nuclear deterrence. Similarly, Agni Prime, which had been tested previously, was retested this time, through a rail-based launching platform. This following analysis outlines the technical specifications of the tested Agni Prime, the technology integrated into the system, and its implications for South Asian stability, given that the missile is deliberately directed at Pakistan due to its limited range.
Technical Parameters
On September 24, 2025, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), in collaboration with the Strategic Forces Command (SFC), launched Agni Prime from a rail-based mobile launching system. It is nuclear-capable and has a range of up to 2000 km, equipped with advanced technologies and a guidance system. The range suggests that it can be classified as a Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM). However, the official press release refered it as an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM). The missile testing validated all technical parameters and fulfilled the operational requirements. Furthermore, it is a two-staged rocket equipped with solid propellant, and both stages are fitted with composite rocket motors and guidance systems for midcourse and terminal guidance. Similarly, the missile is equipped with a Ring Laser Gyroscope-Inertial Navigation System (RLG-INS), enabling the terminal navigation. Thus, reducing the Circular Probable Error (CEP) to only 10 meters.
According to the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the missile is canisterised and a rail-based mobile launcher system, putting India in the elite list of using a train as a launching platform. This makes India the fifth nation after the US, Russia, China, and North Korea to deploy such a system. The rail-based launch system would not require any pre-launch conditions. It is ready to launch and has mobility to ensure survivability through rail networks. As the DRDO’s press release says, “It provides for cross-country mobility and can launch within a short reaction time with reduced visibilityâ€. Regarding its range, it is too short to target mainland China. The shorter range means that the missile is specifically designed to target Pakistan and can easily cover its entire territory.
Strategic Rationale Behind Testing
Survivability is crucial when adversaries can inflict damage, which could eventually lead to a decapitation strike. This can be possible through two ways: procurement of nuclear-powered submarines (SSBNs), which ensures a high level of survivability due to their stealth capabilities. The second is to ensure survivability through a mobile launching system, such as utilizing a TELV (Transporter Erector Launcher Vehicle) or a Rail-Based Missile Launching System (RBMLS). The SSBNs ensure a high level of survivability and provide the assured second-strike capability. Whereas the rail-based system drastically increases survivability through dispersal of missile arsenals in a vast network of railway tracks.
The survivability of using a rail-based missile system is ensured through concealment using tunnels and blending into civilian traffic, thus reducing the visibility and vulnerability from preemptive striking. The railway networks in India stretch to around 70,000 km with extensive tunnels, especially in the Indian Occupied Jammu and Kashmir Region. Currently, it consists of three long tunnels. One is Pir Panjal, which is 11.22 km, and the second is the Sangaldan, which is 8.6 km. However, the T-49 is under construction, which is expected to be around 12.7 km long and likely to be open for traffic in the upcoming years. These tunnels would serve the purpose of stealth and evade detection, ensuring the survivability of the Agni Prime missile.
Therefore, a highly canisterized and rail-mobile force increases strategic ambiguity while further complicating the adversary’s targeting calculus. High mobility, low CEP, and high readiness level raise doubts about an adversary’s ability to detect and preclude launch, thereby strengthening the perceptual threat through an element of surprise and precision strike. Beyond the technical parameters, the missile system also has a doctrinal impact. Survivability and accuracy can be perceived as enhancing counterforce and preemptive options. This could place the adversary into a “use-it or lose-it†dilemma, despite the other side’s pledges to the No-first-use doctrine. This is India’s so-called “compellence through coercionâ€, while considering the nuclear deterrence irrelevant.
Regional Implications for South Asia
Despite rail-based systems having immense capability to strike into the adversary’s heartland, they also present several destabilizing factors, such as issues related to command authorization and the ‘use it or lose it’ doctrine for an adversary, which could pressure them into launching a first strike. Additionally, this could further incite an arms race in the region, as Pakistan is pushed to respond to such developments.
In terms of command and control, during peacetime, the missile may be concealed within tunnels and communicate via electronic links. However, during a crisis, amidst potential spoofing, jamming, and electronic warfare. If the commander loses the signals, who would ensure the security and authorization protocols of that particular missile system, when considering the precedent such as the BrahMos misfire in 2022.
Secondly, the “use it or lose it†dilemma becomes particularly evident as India prepares for counterforce preemption strategies and develops an ambitious defence project like “Sudarshan Chakraâ€, a multilayered defence system. This may instill a false sense of security, encouraging the logic of striking first under the belief that one is protected against any retaliation. Thirdly, the induction of Agni Prime risks further instigating an arms race in the region. As India attempts to create a “new normal†in the region and enforce nuclear brinkmanship, it aims to punish Pakistan in case of any terror attacks. However, Pakistan aims to restore strategic stability in the region through its quid pro quo plus strategy and an interplay of full-spectrum deterrence.
Conclusion
The Agni-Prime test risks destabilizing the region by driving Pakistan to an unwanted arms race. Islamabad could respond in two principal ways: first, by enhancing space-based surveillance, launching or tasking satellites to improve tracking, locating, and precision targeting; or second, by enhancing the survivability of its nuclear forces through sea-based assets such as SSBNs. Prioritizing a survivable sea-based deterrent is sensible because SSBNs provide an assured second-strike capability: even after a devastating first strike, a secure and concealed submarine force can deliver a retaliatory response. Strengthening second-strike forces thus preserves deterrence and reduces incentives for a disarming first strike.
This article was published in another form at https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/defense-security/how-significant-is-indias-rail-based-missile-launching-system/
Mr Saad Riaz is Research Fellow at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad
