In this era, international safeguards on nuclear facilities and controlled access to fissile materials represent crucial barriers against nuclear proliferation and terrorism.  On August 10, 2024, law enforcement agencies in India confiscated 50 grams of radioactive material valued at $100 million and apprehended three individuals in connection with the incident. Superintendent of Police Swarn Prabhat of Gopalganj noted that “the smugglers had attempted to sell this material over several months”. This indicates that the stolen material had been in the possession of the perpetrators for an extended period without being reported by facility operators. India, the largest importer of uranium from countries such as Canada, Kazakhstan, Australia and Russia, and the ninth-largest producer globally, was clearly implicated in the illicit trade of radioactive materials.

The theft of radioactive materials has increasingly become prevalent in India. Over the past two decades, more than 25 similar incidents have been documented. These incidents range from the reported recovery of 2.5 kilograms in 1994 to the most recent case in 2022, highlighting significant shortcomings in Indian nuclear security and the protection of nuclear materials. According to reports in the Indian media, most of the stolen radioactive material originates from enrichment facilities. Several individuals have been apprehended in connection with the trafficking of these materials. For instance, on August 27, 2001, authorities arrested two individuals in West Bengal in possession of over 200 grams of semi-processed uranium. Moreover, in July 1988, the Central Bureau of Intelligence (CBI) uncovered a significant racket involving the theft of uranium in Tamil Nadu, where approximately 8 kilograms of granular nuclear material was seized. Subsequent analysis at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IDCAR) identified two types of substances weighing 6 kilograms in total: U237 and U235, the latter being weapon-grade uranium.

There are several reasons why India consistently fails in protecting nuclear and radiological materials from theft. Firstly, mitigating insider threats and ensuring personnel reliability represent critical aspects of nuclear security mechanisms, where India frequently falls short. Secondly, these incidents underscore that India’s nuclear regulatory framework does not fully align with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidelines. Many of India’s nuclear reactors are not under IAEA safeguards.  Thirdly, the increasing instances of radioactive material slipping into theft highlight India’s poor polices, practices, and experiences in managing and controlling radioactive sources. These factors underscore the vulnerable position of India’s nuclear facilities in South Asia and their broader implications for the region.

The great danger of radioactive theft lacks the control on the safeguarding of nuclear material. This can create clandestine black markets which will be enormously hazardous to the world at large.  In the 2022 episode, a precious commodity was being sold illegally for INR 350 million per kg.  Therefore, the repeated thefts of radioactive material in India is a matter of grave concern for both the international community as well as South Asian states. The frequent occurrence of theft of nuclear material is particularly worrisome as it indicates a regular flow of clandestine material for illegal sale and dispersal. Among all nuclear-powered states, India’s nuclear facilities are notably the most susceptible to nuclear terrorism. This vulnerability is exacerbated by ongoing insurgencies within Indian states.  Nuclear terrorism involves the various ways in which nuclear materials could be exploited as terrorist weapons. In India’s case, due to the deficiencies in its nuclear command and control mechanisms, it becomes relatively easy for terrorists to develop and deploy radiological dispersion weapons or dirty bombs. As India’s nuclear capabilities continue to expand, the risk posed by radiological and nuclear terrorism to its facilities will inevitably increase.  India’s nuclear facilities, particularly those in regions with ongoing political violence or insurgencies, are vulnerable to terrorist attacks. For example, states like Bihar have seen significant political unrest and violence, which raises concerns about the security of nuclear sites in such areas. The fear is that if these facilities were targeted or accessed by terrorists, it could lead to severe consequences, including potential nuclear terrorism. The international community, especially the United States (US), should reconsider or revoke India’s Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) waiver to ensure stricter controls and oversight. This could potentially reduce the risk of nuclear materials falling into the wrong hands.

This article was published in another form at https://policyeast.com/lapses-in-indian-nuclear-security/

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Mr Syed Ali Abbas

Research Officer/ Comm Officer/ Managing Editor CISS Insight

Syed Ali Abbas is a Research Officer/Communication Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad. Previously, he served as an associate editor at Indus News Network. His areas of interest include Middle East politics, military modernization, foreign policy, and nuclear politics. He has contributed to various platforms, including The National Interest, South Asian Voices, and others.

Dr Anum Riaz

Associate Director Research

Dr. Anum Riaz is the Associate Director Research at the Center for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Department of Political Science at Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan. She also possesses M.Phil. and M.Sc. degrees from the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. Additionally, she has taught BS and Master’s students at the Department of Political Science at Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan. Her areas of interest include strategic studies, international relations, international nuclear politics, the nuclear non-proliferation regime, arms control and disarmament, as well as traditional and non-traditional security issues.

Dr Bilal Zubair

Director Research

Dr. Bilal Zubair has worked as an Assistant Professor at the National Defence University Islamabad and Lecturer at the National University of Science and Technology. He holds a Ph.D. and M. Phil. in International Relations from Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad. Dr. Zubair is author of the book Chinese Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in the United States (Palgrave Macmillan, 2024) and contributed to several journal articles and book chapters focusing on soft power, diplomacy, and China’s role in international relations.

His research has been published in various academic journals, and he has presented at international conferences Dr. Zubair has also been an active reviewer and editorial board member. His professional interests include great power politics, and the role of communication in global diplomacy.

Mr Mobeen Jafar Mir

Research Officer

Mobeen Jafar Mir is a Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad. His research focuses on U.S. foreign policy, particularly in the areas of strategy, technology, and arms control. He is currently pursuing an M.Phil. in International Relations at the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He can be found on Twitter @jafar_mobeen.

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