The contemporary world is undergoing an excessive change shaped by a single superpower, now changed by the automation of different centres of influence and competition. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) increase the confidence of this shift and strategic collaboration between leaders who want subsequent alternatives to the Western-led global order. In a recent meeting, XI Jinping, along with Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong, suggested a detailed assertion of these shifts. The three leaders pointed out the need for a new governance framework that questions the old structure.
The SCO focuses on security, counter terrorism and economic collaborations by promoting multipolarity through closer trade, political and cultural ties. Moreover, the agenda of the BRICS is to reform global governance, increase economic and financial cooperation by creating new, fairer institutions and a more balanced world order.
Now the world is moving away from the US; its allies, like South Korea, are doubting its security structure. A survey shows that 70 % of South Koreans want their own nuclear weapons. They fear that Washington will not risk their own country to defend them against North Korea. At the same time, the tough immigration rules, like cancelling visas and deportations, make the students and workers avoid the country, which harms its global reputation.
These transformations show the rise of multipolarity, and the SCO has evolved into an organisation that not only works for the regional stability but also for the strategic interests of both China and Russia. BRICS is now focused on counterbalancing the West, which was once majorly used for financial cooperation. Such moves show frustration with already existing institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, which are usually influenced by the West.
Amidst this evolving landscape, India is attempting to garner the support of both blocs. India, after a strategic partnership with Washington, has increased its collaboration with Russia and China. Through economic cooperation, it maintains a useful relationship with China. For Example, China removes the export restrictions on fertilisers, rare earth magnets and tunnel boring machines, which help India to strengthen their industrial and infrastructure development. Through this, India tries to maximise its national autonomy whilst diversifying its foreign policy. India’s involvement in the SCO and the BRICS, hence, points out India’s interest in benefiting from the Western and non-Western collaboration. Now the West is realising that India, under the defence and technologies partnership with the US, also uses non-Western powers for their strategic interest, like buying crude oil from Russia. As a result of this, the US imposed 25% tariffs on India over claims of exploitation.
The alteration of the world order is not an analytical debate about institutions, but it has implications for security, economic developments and regional stability. The countries which are located at the crossroads of such rivalries, a multipolar system presents both opportunities and the risks to them. On the one hand, the smaller states get opportunities to build partnerships with major power countries. For instance, they can get cooperative deals regarding energy, defence collaboration and infrastructure projects. On the other hand, strategic management becomes difficult for such smaller countries because of growing rivalries between different blocs, as relying too much on one side can cause serious costs. For example, Islamabad has gained investment via CPEC under China’s Belt and Road Initiative, but it is also difficult for Pakistan to maintain good relations with the US because of the US-China rivalry.
Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy is to counterbalance Beijing’s influence. For instance, the states involved in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (US, India, Japan and Australia) are compelled by the West not to be part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Other regional players which are managed by the Chinese economic prospects are also careful of Beijing’s increasing economic influence. For example, Indonesia and Kazakhstan have greatly benefited from the China-led BRI Initiative. Indonesia alone received USD 9.3 billion in 2024 for the improvement of its trade, infrastructure projects, and to reduce poverty. In a multipolar system, it is difficult to balance security along with economic responsibilities.
The importance of both organisations, the SCO and the BRICS, reflects the desire to opt for an alternative world governance which is based on equality. Xi Jinping said in a recent summit that, “We should advocate for equal and orderly multipolarisation of the world, open economic globalisation and promote a more just and equitable governance system.†In the past few years, both organisations have started engaging new people and enhancing their global prestige. The BRICS countries are initiating de-dollarisation by using alternative currencies to the US Dollar, showing their effort for an equitable and accessible economic order. Moreover, the SCO has initiated joint military exercises and counterterrorism efforts to maintain regional stability. This shows an image of regional unity, and such trends show a constant realignment away from the West.
The endurance of the SCO and BRICS mechanisms cannot be achieved without confronting the challenges. For instance, within the SCO and the BRICS, many questions arise about their endurance and cohesion. Moreover, the conflicting national interests of member states could destroy the ability to act in an integrated manner. For instance, the relationship of India with China is under strain under the framework of the BRICS and the SCO. Similarly, India hijacks the SCO platform with an attempt to isolate malign Pakistan. For example, at the 2025 SCO Summit, India refused to sign the joint statement, saying it supported Pakistan.
Amidst the transition of the world from unipolarity to multipolarity, states are widening their foreign policy choices and reducing their dependency on one bloc. Through collaborations, they engage in multiple economic modernisations. But they also demand diplomatic flexibility to manage great powers’ expectations, especially during the Ukraine-Russia conflict. When the competition intensifies, the chances of escalation of conflict to the whole region and beyond increase. The US has created blocs as per its latest National Security Strategy (NSS) through QUAD and AUKUS. Such polices and alignments increase the risk of regional tensions. In comparison, the stability of bipolar and multipolar conflict observed in the Cold War is defined by the lack of established rules that escalate tensions and their potential risks. The fragmentation of the post-Cold War world order is an important feature of the 21st century. SCO and the BRICS show the interest of non-Western states in establishing institutions of their own interests. The multipolarity gives space for new constraints for the medium and small states, but the main challenge is to turn fragmentation into an opportunity by protecting sovereignty. In this emerging world order, the flexibility in diplomacy and strategy will determine which states face restrictions and gain advantages.
This article was published in another form at https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/politics-governance/strategic-blocs-and-the-balancing-acts-in-the-emerging-global-order/
Shahwana Binte Sohail is is Research Assistant at the Centre for International Strategic Studies Islamabad.
