There exist widely held Western concerns that the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)’s expansion into a formidable regional organization in Eurasia is due to shared anti-US sentiments prevailing among its major member states. The argument, however, is erroneous and misses out on the developments that led to its gradual evolution.
The ‘Shanghai Five’ formed in 1996 was SCO’s predecessor and initially laid the groundwork for Sino-Russia strategic partnership in Central Asia. The association was aimed at discussing ‘confidence-building measures (CBMs) and the demarcation issue in the former Soviet-Chinese border region.’ This gradual process of resolving border issues and signing CBMs to tone down tensions gave birth to the ‘Shanghai Process,’ a name that later became synonymous with ‘stability and trust’ among its original five founding members.
In 2001, Uzbekistan became a full-fledged sixth member of the organisation, and the ‘Shanghai Five’ turned into SCO. Later in 2017, India and Pakistan joined SCO as full members, extending it to its eight existing members. The catalyst for this spirit was undoubtedly the early cooperation on border issues. This ‘legacy of border successes’ played a significant role in the development of SCO. Other broader objectives of SCO were combatting terrorism, fighting drug-trafficking, and tackling human smuggling.
Probably, the most daunting challenge facing this rich legacy of border successes and thus sabotaging SCO, is coming from India; a country that in addition to Uzbekistan and Pakistan, is not a part of the original ‘Shanghai process.’
Pakistan is a strategic ally of China and resolved its border issues with Beijing through a Pakistan-China boundary agreement on March 3, 1963. Pakistan therefore is committed to the obligations in the SCO charter. It is an important partner in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and links China’s Xinjiang to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port through BRI’s flagship project China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The corridor that was recently extended to Afghanistan is also welcomed by Central Asian states (CARs), Iran, and even Saudi Arabia. The only country that has been criticizing CPEC is India.
Likewise, Uzbekistan that shares borders with all its four Central Asian neighbours, is also diplomatically and peacefully resolving border issues with its neighbours. In December last year, it amicably settled all pending border disputes with Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan and initiated talks with Tajikistan to solve the border issues.
India, on the other hand, has territorial disputes with two major SCO members: China and Pakistan. With Pakistan, it shares a dispute over the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) state whose special status was unilaterally abrogated by India in 2019, resulting in an intensification of tensions between the two nuclear-power states. In China’s case, both Asian giants have fought a war in 1962 and relations between both states have recently further deteriorated over their contested Himalayan border.
Indian unwillingness to be a part of joint efforts to resolve the disputed J&K conflict was evident in Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar’s slamming of his Pakistan counterpart for raising the issue of abrogation of article 370 at SCO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Goa, India. ‘Wake up, smell the coffee, 370 is history,’ was Jaishankar’s flippant remark. Similarly, during the SCO Defence Ministers meeting, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh expressed opposition and hostility towards Chinese Defence Minister Li Shangfu, both verbally and non-verbally. Experts also believe that Indian decision to host the 23rd Summit of Council of Heads of State of SCO ‘virtually’ on July 4, 2023, rather than ‘in person’ indicates New Delhi’s uneasy relationship with Beijing within SCO.
These developments are likely to offer a dimmer outlook for the future expansion of SCO if the organization failed to become a platform for its member states to join hands on one common denominator in their respective interests i.e., resolving border issues.
Why does India keep SCO on low priority?
India has become an important part of the US policy of containing China in the Asia Pacific. Its membership in multilateral security arrangements like QUAD is mainly focused on countering China. As part of China-containment policy, India does not desist itself from opposing Beijing on multilateral forums including SCO, making the environment unconducive for dialogue.
India is aspiring to become a member of NATO-plus security alliance to boost its defence cooperation with the west. In conformity with this, India has decided to hold the 2023 annual summit virtually which would allow it to complete the summit without Russian and Chinese participation. This Indian decision could be a move to ensure its membership process in the NATO-plus alliance, strengthening its position in the US-led bloc politics.
India’s disinclination to dialogue, using SCO forum to denounce China and Pakistan and obstructing progress for development in SCO implies that SCO is trivial for India compared to its strategic partnership with the US. India’s broader aim is to strengthen this partnership which may ultimately subvert SCO’s role. Indian policymakers presumably think that India does not need SCO for bettering its ties with Russia and the Central Asian Republics (CARs).
A stable region is in the interests of all the parties and both China and Pakistan remained steadfast in their commitment to bring security and prosperity in the region. Whereas India joined SCO for merely playing out the balancing role against Pakistan. It may enable India to achieve its short-term goals, but it could affect the unity among SCO members, leading to lesser chances of constructive cooperation in the future.
This increasing instability in Southern Asia is causing concern to the policy circles of Pakistan and China and in this fragile security landscape, SCO can play a constructive role toward diminishing tensions between three nuclear-power neighbors. Indian policymakers, rather than playing to the domestic crowd, should take into account the importance of SCO for resolving regional border tensions through promoting dialogue and paving way for cooperation.
This article was published in another form at https://pakistanpolitico.com/sco2/
Maryyum Masood is working as a Research Officer & Associate Editor at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) Islamabad. She is an MPhil scholar in the Department of Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (NDU) Islamabad.
Mr Mobeen Jafar Mir is Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.
