A deadly conflict between India and Pakistan was witnessed last week. After the Pahalgam attack on April 22, India has launched a couple of dozen  missile and armed drone strikes in Azad Kashmir and mainland Pakistan, killing more than 26 innocent civilians including women and children. It was a blatant attack on Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty and a breach of international law. In response to this, Pakistan claimed the downing of 6 Indian jets, including 3 Rafale jets. In an escalation of the conflict, at least one of them has been shot down and confirmed by French intelligence as well. In the early hours of 8th May, India launched numerous drone attacks in different cities of Pakistan, including Rawalpindi and Lahore. This unprovoked provocation is another step upward in the escalation ladder. Pakistan responded in kind and launched a barrage of rockets and missiles on legitimate Indian military targets rather than population centers targeting civilians. The situation de-escalated in a rather surprising turn of events when President Donald Trump announced that a negotiated ceasefire has been achieved by US’ efforts between the warring parties.

Since the past two decades or so, different terror incidents carried out by non-state actors in the Indian controlled part of Kashmir, have elicited a wide range of responses from the various Indian governments. But from the intense stand-off (2001-02) to alleged surgical strikes (2016) and then the Pulwama-Balakot crisis (2019), Indian allegations against Pakistan, without providing any actionable evidence, has been a recurring theme. The recent incident at Pahalgam replicated a similar positioning by New Delhi without any concrete proof of linkages with Pakistan. Such allegations are tantamount to building a case for striking Pakistan, though they occurred as a result of the Indian intelligence and security failure. These so-called responses have intensified over the period, crossing different times and conventional thresholds. All this point towards a more sinister scenario of the Indian quest for escalation dominance in a nuclearized environment. The war mongering of the Indian digital media and policy makers underscores the dangerous notion of a limited war below the nuclear threshold between the two countries. Serious tensions since the Pahalgam incident proved that Kashmir could transform into a nuclear flashpoint.

The diffusion and management of post-nuclearization escalations without any nuclear crisis can give a false sense of confidence to the strategic planners regarding their ability to curtail crises across the border. This can especially embolden the Indian decision makers to up the ante for asserting dominance in the escalation ladder. It can inadvertently lead to an uncontrollable disaster in a very short time. Military crises are not new to India and Pakistan, but the escalating trajectories in the past two decades paint a grim picture for peace and stability in the region.

Another factor is the increase in economic and political clout of India, with shifting currents of global politics leading to Indo-US strategic partnership, which has enormously encouraged India to flex its military muscle against Pakistan with impunity.

The response from influential capitals towards the India-Pakistan crisis has been lukewarm. Many countries offered mediation between the two countries, but the Indian search for partners not preachers, as mentioned by the Indian Minister of External Affairs, wasn’t helpful until the US intervened. The Trump administration downplayed the standoff between India and Pakistan, given its priorities elsewhere. Lack of pressure from the international community encouraged India to further escalate with missile strikes by using drones in major cities of Pakistan. This can best be attributed to Indian attempt at escalation dominance.

Escalation dominance refers to a nation’s ability to control and dictate the pace and intensity of a conflict, particularly when nuclear weapons are involved. Escalation dominance has an exceedingly significant role to play in the India-Pakistan nuclear dyad.

A terrorist attack instigated India to breach the sovereignty of Pakistan and India is to be blamed for starting the escalation. After the overt nuclearization of the region, Pakistan has strived to dominate the escalation ladder, along with maintaining a superior force ratio at decisive points, to maintain deterrence and preserve peace by raising the stakes for the aggressor in the wake of military confrontation with India. This has deterred India so far from engaging Pakistan militarily and escalating things to the point of no return. A full-scale conventional war has also been averted thus far. On the other hand, India’s wish to dominate the escalation ladder, coupled with the desire for a limited conventional war under a nuclear threshold, can be extremely dangerous for the conventional stability and nuclear deterrence in the South Asian region.

Pakistan’s avowed policy of “quid pro quo plus”, as was evident from the Pulwama-Balakot crisis in 2019, retaliation means that any Indian strike, no matter how limited, will be met with a response designed to inflict equal or greater pain. But getting involved in the dangerous game of escalating moves and retaliatory moves for dominance over the escalation ladder underscores the unpredictability and uncontrollable consequences for both the conflicting parties.

Indian unhindered attacks on the major cities of Pakistan, through drones, point towards the wearing down of the deterrence ingredients with grave implications for the regional stability equation in the coming years. Missile and drone attacks, from an Indian perspective, raised the costs for Pakistan, and will see the escalation ladder climb as a losing bet, where matching Indian aggressiveness at every stage will not be an option. This points towards the cementing of escalation dominance by India, in the wake of the India-Pakistan crisis. This may also erode ‘crisis stability’ in the future conflicts as well by incentivizing India to attack Pakistan with little fear of retaliation. Pakistan’s response according to some, took India off-guard as a retaliation wasn’t expected by the Indian leadership as Modi mentioned in his speech with utmost surprise that “rather they started attacking us.” By attacking Pakistani civilians and military installations, India put to test Pakistani resolve to maintain its sovereignty and national integrity. Pakistan’s response was calculated; retaliatory and only legitimate military targets were engaged which shows Pakistan’s respect for international law, by deliberately avoiding civilian casualties during the heat of the conflict.

This article was published in another form at https://cissajk.org.pk/2025/06/16/indian-quest-for-escalation-dominance-a-dangerous-notion-for-deterrence-in-south-asia/

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Mr Syed Ali Abbas

Research Officer/ Comm Officer/ Managing Editor CISS Insight

Syed Ali Abbas is a Research Officer/Communication Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad. Previously, he served as an associate editor at Indus News Network. His areas of interest include Middle East politics, military modernization, foreign policy, and nuclear politics. He has contributed to various platforms, including The National Interest, South Asian Voices, and others.

Dr Anum Riaz

Associate Director Research

Dr. Anum Riaz is the Associate Director Research at the Center for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Department of Political Science at Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan. She also possesses M.Phil. and M.Sc. degrees from the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. Additionally, she has taught BS and Master’s students at the Department of Political Science at Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan. Her areas of interest include strategic studies, international relations, international nuclear politics, the nuclear non-proliferation regime, arms control and disarmament, as well as traditional and non-traditional security issues.

Dr Bilal Zubair

Director Research

Dr. Bilal Zubair has worked as an Assistant Professor at the National Defence University Islamabad and Lecturer at the National University of Science and Technology. He holds a Ph.D. and M. Phil. in International Relations from Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad. Dr. Zubair is author of the book Chinese Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in the United States (Palgrave Macmillan, 2024) and contributed to several journal articles and book chapters focusing on soft power, diplomacy, and China’s role in international relations.

His research has been published in various academic journals, and he has presented at international conferences Dr. Zubair has also been an active reviewer and editorial board member. His professional interests include great power politics, and the role of communication in global diplomacy.

Mr Mobeen Jafar Mir

Research Officer

Mobeen Jafar Mir is a Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad. His research focuses on U.S. foreign policy, particularly in the areas of strategy, technology, and arms control. He is currently pursuing an M.Phil. in International Relations at the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He can be found on Twitter @jafar_mobeen.

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