In the South Asian nuclear debate, Indian media has tried to construct a nationalist portrait that presents India as a responsible nuclear state, whilst declaring Pakistan a frequent threat. Pakistan’s nuclear program, from its beginnings in the 1950s, has consistently supported peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Its initial commitment to nuclear energy was shaped by its involvement in the US-sponsored “Atoms for Peace†program, through which Pakistan developed its civilian nuclear capabilities for medical purposes, agriculture, industrial development, and electricity generation. The formation of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) in 1956 focused on exploring nuclear science for internal development. But after the tests of India’s nuclear weapons in 1998, Pakistan held similar tests soon after for deterrence and strategic stability in the region.
India, from the start of its nuclear program, used civilian atomic technology for military objectives, as evidenced in the Pokhran tests in 1974, named Smiling Buddha. India diverted fuel from the CIRUS reactor provided by the US and Canada strictly for peaceful uses to attain military objectives. India declared that it required conducting nuclear tests for peaceful purposes such as mining, earthmoving, and canal digging. India undermined international safeguards and misused the drive of the Atoms for Peace program. This violation of international norms directly led to the creation of London Group later named the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and targeted India’s violation of its commitment to develop its nuclear program under the guise of civilian use of nuclear weaponization, leading Pakistan to reevaluate its security and follow the path to stabilize nuclear deterrence.
Later in 2008, the India-US civil nuclear deal permitted India to use civilian nuclear technology and trade, despite its refusal to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India was allowed to retain various civil nuclear reactors outside the IAEA safeguards, permitting it to divert domestic uranium to its military program. Robert Einhorn, Senior Advisor at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, and Daryl Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association, noted that this lacuna permitted India to considerably expand its nuclear capabilities. This deal not only endorsed India’s position as a nuclear state but also ruined the credibility of the non-proliferation regime while increasing the strategic disparity in South Asia.
These developments were incorrectly portrayed by the Indian media as its strategic necessity. On the other hand, the Indian media persistently described Pakistan as the nuclear aggressor, describing its nuclear program as a proliferation risk and danger to world security, whilst portraying India’s nuclear development as a strategic “transformation.†This biased description intentionally overlooked India’s unsafeguarded nuclear complexes and ambiguous practices, establishing a one-sided view that supported India as a “responsible†nuclear state. Indian media manipulated public and international perceptions to distract from any investigation into India’s growing nuclear and military modernisation. This was an attempt to support regional strategic disparity at the expense of Pakistan.
The nuclear program of Pakistan focuses on Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD), aimed at sustaining regional stability and preventing hostility. This approach highlights a controlled nuclear posture, concentrates on deterring risks from India and prevents an arms race. Pakistan started the Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) to resist India’s Cold Start Doctrine by safeguarding a credible nuclear response at all phases of conflict. To maintain strategic stability in the region and prevent aggression, FSD boosts deterrence under the policy of credible minimum deterrence. Pakistan’s doctrine includes measures such as qualitative development of nuclear weapons and non-deployment to counter Indian offensive nuclear ambitions and mitigate the risks of sudden escalation.
India is enhancing its nuclear weapons stockpile, focusing on extended technological advancements and strategic reach. For example, the expansion of the Agni V intercontinental ballistic missile, efficient in hauling Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), shows a shift toward more adaptable and active nuclear actions. The programme of Agni VI is back on track, where the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is proactively working on the Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) variant.
During covering such Indian developments, the media of India portrayed their nuclear advancements positively and highlighted it as essential, strategic and directed towards technological developments. The MIRVs test within the Anni V missile series was celebrated as an important achievement, with debate on its negative impact on the regional arms equation. On the other hand, the media of India portrayed Pakistan’s MIRVs test as an offensive move planned to challenge strategic stability in the region.
Moreover, India’s acquisition of a nuclear triad, including air-delivered weapons, land-based missiles, and sea-based platforms, coupled with offensive doctrines, indicates its deterrent capability as offensive vis-à -vis Pakistan. The launch of nuclear-powered submarines, such as the Indian Naval Submarines (INS) Arihant, increases India’s second-strike capability. However, this undermines mutual deterrence, increases the arms race and risks of miscalculations during a conflict in South Asia.
India is not competent enough to have such sophisticated technologies. For instance, on 9th March 2022, India fired a Brahmos supersonic cruise missile that fell near a town in Pakistan, Mian Chanu. This missile is India’s up-to-date weapon system with strategic implications. The misfiring of Brahmos was an attempt to not only check Pakistan’s air defences but also undermine the territorial integrity of Pakistan. Despite the presence of a Direct line of Communication mechanism between India and Pakistan, India did not inform Pakistan about the Brahmos misfiring accident to determine if the misfiring was intentional or accidental.
The Defence Minister of India, Rajnath Singh, on 17th May 2025, said, “IAEA should take control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, Pakistan’s nukes should come under the IAEA watch.†He should know that the IAEA deals with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and prevents its misuse. The Foreign Ministry of Pakistan criticised the remarks, describing them as reflective of “profound insecurity and frustration” over Pakistan’s conventional military capabilities, which are sufficient to deter Indian aggression without reliance on nuclear threats. It was evidence of India’s frustration and insecurity about Pakistan’s efficient defence and deterrence against Indian hostility through conventional methods. India claims to follow a No First Use (NFU) doctrine, but Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh stated that however, what happens in the future would depend on the circumstances. The diverse doctrines and portrayals by Indian media further increase mutual distrust and sabotage Pakistan’s attempts towards arms control and conflict settlements in South Asia. Although Pakistan highlights restraint and deterrence, India’s modernisation of nuclear and military capabilities, coupled with biased media reports, is likely to increase security dilemmas and increase the possibility of conflict escalation in South Asia. A balanced and fact-based media reporting and dialogue between India and Pakistan are necessary to address misinformation and build confidence between these two nuclear-armed states. The transparent communication and compliance with global norms can help reduce tensions and sustain stability in the region.
This article was published in another form at https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/defense-security/indias-media-narratives-on-its-unsafeguarded-nuclear-program/
Shahwana Binte Sohail is is Research Assistant at the Centre for International Strategic Studies Islamabad.
