The diverging ideological and geopolitical interests of India and the United States can make the future of their strategic partnership murkier, and the ultimate effect of this cumbersome situation would be on stability in South Asia.
The US is advancing its strategic ties with India on political, economic, technological, and military fronts. The shared realpolitik rationale given for this burgeoning partnership is to counter China’s rise. India presents the political image, supported by some in the US, of being the world’s largest democracy and the US needs to cooperate with like-minded governments to counter autocracies and maintain a rules-based order. Both countries, however, not only have ideological differences but also stand at variance with each other on geopolitical ambitions.
Under India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government, the state’s democratic charter has gone into a nosedive, with leading think tanks terming the phenomenon as India’s journey from democracy to ‘electoral autocracy.’ Notions of democracy and autocracy need to be redefined before the containment hawks in the White House draw parallels between the two democracies.
On the one hand, the US views its struggle with China through a great power rivalry lens in which India remains ‘the most important’ strategic bulwark to contain China. On the other hand, New Delhi sees the ‘New Cold War’ rivalry as an opportunity to achieve its regional hegemony and great power status goal while suppressing other regional states and maintaining trade ties with Beijing in the garb of political pluralism.
The recent visit of Indian prime minister Narendra Modi to the US has been hailed as a new apex of the partnership between both states. The history of so-called close ties between India and the US goes back to 1949 when Indian prime minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru visited the country and met US president Harry Truman. However, over the years, India hedged its bets by proclaiming a leadership role in the Non-Aligned Movement and keeping diplomatic doors open for the US and also the Soviet Union for political engagements.
At the request of Nehru during the Indo-China War of 1962, Washington provided India with military assistance, arms, and political support. After the end of the Cold War, the ties between both states entered a new phase of congeniality as India began to align itself with the new superpower besides enhancing diplomacy, military ties, trade, and people-to-people contacts with Russia as well. The shifting US strategies in the wake of Chinese emergence as a global power have given India the opportunity to benefit and synergize with US efforts to counter a ‘common’ competitor.
The US-India defense framework signed in 2005 led to a nuclear deal, among other strategic agreements. There has been no looking back on bilateral relations since then. As this strategic partnership moves forward, there are different views on its future trajectory.
There is a growing debate among scholars and experts on the Indian position if US-China conflict emerges or intensifies into a war. In a New York Times editorial written before prime minister Modi’s visit in July 2023, the state of democracy and human rights in India and the misalignment of foreign policy interests of both states were highlighted. New Delhi has a history of playing both sides against the middle in a great power competition. The misalignment of geopolitical strategies of Washington and New Delhi is a big question mark on the nature of their partnership.
The joint statement of the Modi-Biden meeting reflects their vision of being close partners. However, it is interesting to see the states following different visions about the global order as the ‘closest partners.’ Their position on the ongoing Ukraine conflict and dealings with Iran are cases in point, but the differences are not limited to these. Others include opposing views on relations with Bangladesh’s Sheikh Hasina Wazed and Myanmar’s military junta.
The US announced a new visa policy for Bangladesh in May 2023, proposing the denial of visas to those who obscure free and fair elections in the country. It was an allusion to the Bangladeshi leader. Modi, on the other hand, has not supported the US approach toward Bangladesh and instead urged his Bengali counterpart for stronger bilateral ties.
Similarly, since the military junta’s takeover in Myanmar, the US has taken a strict stance against its State Administrative Council, sanctioning the Burmese military regime and repeatedly calling for the restoration of democracy. On the other hand, India is still one of the major arms suppliers to the military junta and has remained committed to its pre-coup economic ties and investments. Also, the Indian plans on using its currency in global trade instead of the American dollar can expedite the process of de-dollarization, significantly hampering US interests.
Moreover, India is concomitantly part of Washington- and China-led groups. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), dubbed ‘Asian NATO’ by China, includes India, Japan, Australia, and the US. China- and Russia-dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) group also include India. Several Western experts see the SCO and BRICS as a challenge to the present US-led global order – that it can be replaced by an alternative one under the China-Russia leadership.
If the converging foreign policy goals of India and the US is to contain China, both states have different priorities. The US’s priority is to stop China from becoming a hegemon in its region. The competition is one of the great power rivalries in which the US believes, with the help of its allies and partners, it can contain Beijing’s ascendancy. On the contrary, India sees US-China competition as an opportunity to carve out a leadership role in the region and beyond. Strategic partnerships with the US-led West benefit India in gaining unprecedented military, economic, and technological strength which may prove to be counterproductive for regional peace and security.
In a US-China competition or even a conflict, whether India will stand with Washington on the front lines or sit out, wait, and then present itself as a global leader is a question whose answer can only be predicted and not ascertained – the past and present can shed enough light though. South Asian strategic stability will be affected in any of these situations because as the great power competition sharpens and India persists in its policy of hedging its bets, it will continue to ramp up its military modernization with Western backing on the naïve assumption that it will act as a bulwark against China. It will neither serve the US mission of China’s containment nor will it bring any stability to the region.
Mr Mobeen Jafar Mir is Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.
Abdul Moiz Khan is Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.
