The field of chemical research is undergoing a transformation that outpaces the international governance frameworks. The rapid development of AI, digital chemistry and automated laboratory systems are also affecting chemical research. This technological scene has raised a new debate among States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The challenge is how to proceed with the export of sensitive chemicals and technologies without compromising Article XI’s promise of peaceful scientific cooperation. Many of the technologies are “dual-use” – that is, they can be used in lawful scientific and industrial research but also for unlawful purposes. Though there is no dichotomy between scientific cooperation and chemical security, a challenge to make sure that both complements, not compromise, each other exists.
The underlying principle of the Chemical Weapons Convention expressed in Article XI is that disarmament should not be achieved at the expense of development. This Convention is not only intended to eradicate chemical weapons but also to allow all States Parties to enjoy the benefits of the peaceful application of chemistry. Access to scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and capacity building continues to be very important for economic growth, health care, agriculture and sustainable development. This is more relevant than ever today, when developing countries want to be more active in scientific innovation and the need to enhance national chemical safety and security.
Meanwhile, there have been huge advances in science that make chemical governance even more difficult. Many chemicals, technologies and research tools have legitimate civilian applications but can also be misused. Emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and automated laboratory systems have increased these risks through advanced chemical technology. For example, AI-assisted molecular design can rapidly identify new chemical compounds for pharmaceutical research, but the same capability could also be exploited to generate toxic compounds if used irresponsibly. Export controls thus play an important role in this context to minimise proliferation risks and ensure the safe transfer of sensitive materials and technologies.
The question isn’t so much whether export controls exist, as how they work. They continue to be a key element of the international non-proliferation regime. The bigger challenge is that they are implemented fairly, transparently and predictably. There have been calls for a more complete application of Article XI in many developing countries, and other countries have stressed the importance of continuing to have effective control over sensitive chemicals and technology. There is no conflict between these positions. Both are essential in creating a credible chemical security framework. Trust is fostered through peaceful scientific cooperation and development, and responsibility in export controls limits proliferation. The Convention is designed to achieve both objectives.
The way forward is not to find a middle ground between one framework and the other. Instead, Article XI and export controls should be considered complementary aspects of the CWC. Article XI encourages cooperation in the peaceful use of science and technology, exchange of technology and capacity building and export control is used to reduce the risk of diversion or transfer of sensitive materials and technology for prohibited purposes. They combine to strengthen international security, and to advance science. In an era of new technologies like artificial intelligence, digital chemistry and automated laboratory systems, which are changing the face of chemical industry, this equilibrium is becoming more and more critical. These innovations can have a positive impact on accelerating scientific discovery but also can raise concerns for dual-use applications. The aim is not to block innovation but to make sure that it is done in a secure and responsible international environment.
Achieving this balance will require good international cooperation, and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is well placed to help. The OPCW must remain a verification body and must also continue its adaptation to the scientific and technological evolution. Capacity building, scientific interaction, education and discussion regarding new technologies can be effective ways to assist States Parties to strengthen chemical security and peaceful scientific cooperation. More importantly, it may serve as a platform for building trust and finding common ground regarding the implementation of Article XI and responsible export controls. The role of governments is also pivotal in realizing this balance. Export controls should be clear, predictable and risk-based, not restrictive in scope. There should be unlimited access to sensitive materials for legitimate scientific research, academic institutions and industry with effective national control. This is a way to enhance confidence in and the international security of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Trust is also necessary among States Parties for a balanced implementation. The major issues about Article XI tend to be related to fairness, access to peaceful scientific cooperation and uniform application of export controls. This can be addressed through ongoing consultation and engagement, technical support, scientific capacity development and by good faith implementation of the Convention. However, more than cooperation between governments is needed to build trust. Students, industry and universities are important in the dissemination of good research practices. By working hands-on, their efforts can impact policies to stop abuse without interfering with legitimate scientific research. Awareness of the risks of ‘dual use’ and innovation can be promoted through good collaboration between governments, scientific institutions and industry. The success of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in the future will be largely determined by how flexible it can be in the face of fast modern scientific and technological advances. States Parties should not see Article XI (the promotion of the peaceful use of chemicals, technology, and scientific knowledge) as being against export controls, which aim to prevent the misuse of sensitive chemicals, and export controls as rivals, but rather as complementary pillars of the Convention. A two-way approach can be used to enable scientific collaboration to take place on a legitimate basis and not lead to proliferation. The credibility and long-term effectiveness of the Convention would slowly be eroded if either of these pillars were impaired. States Parties should implement Article XI and export controls in an open, responsible, and non-discriminatory way, in a rapidly evolving chemical landscape where artificial intelligence, digital chemistry and automated laboratories play a major role. This will enhance global chemical security and maintain the good of chemistry for peaceful uses. Finally, the question of cooperation versus control is not one that can be settled completely by itself, but one that must be solved in conjunction with the development of the necessary cooperative mechanisms to solve the new technological problems.
This article was published by the Centre for Strategic and Contemporary Research in another form at https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/defense-security/bridging-export-controls-and-peaceful-scientific-cooperation-in-chemical-research/
Shahwana Binte Sohail is is Research Assistant at the Centre for International Strategic Studies Islamabad.
