War has moved beyond the traditional domains of land, air, and sea to cyberspace and outer space, with AI being integrated into military systems and operations. This has created new vulnerabilities for states. Conventional deterrence strategies that establish the threat of retaliation in conventional and strategic domains are not effective enough to deter cyberattacks, attacks on space-based assets, and malicious use of AI. All three pillars of deterrence: capability, credibility, and communication, face challenges in the cyber and outer space domains. This raises a fundamental question: can cross-domain deterrence remain credible against unattributed attacks, unclear red lines, and retaliation strategies in the cyber and space domains?
Establishing cross-domain deterrence necessitates the capability to threaten an adversary with retaliation in one or more domains to dissuade it from attacking in any particular domain. The ability to impose costs in multiple domains raises the perceived cost of aggression due to fear of massive retaliation. Traditionally, states have maintained cross-domain deterrence by demonstrating extensive retaliation or denial capabilities, establishing credibility of threat, and communicating effectively. Credible deterrence requires knowing who attacked, what actions cross the threshold, and what response will follow. Cyber and space warfare have introduced new dimensions to warfighting that challenge cross-domain deterrence in various ways.
The issue of attribution of attacks is arguably the major challenge to cross-domain deterrence in the cyber and space domains. In all other warfare domains, identifying the attacker is usually uncomplicated. On the other hand, the actors involved in cyberattacks or disruption of space-based assets usually remain anonymous. Attackers use various techniques, including bouncing between computers and concealing the location and source of the attack.
An estimated 45% of politically motivated cyberattacks from 2000 to 2023 went unattributed. The European Repository of Cyber Incidents (EuRepoC), identified 4733 cyberattacks conducted by 1022 threat groups from 2000 to 2026, although it remains unclear whether these attacks were state-sponsored or criminal in nature. In outer space, non-kinetic attacks in the form of jamming, electronic warfare, or use of directed energy weapons can be difficult to attribute.
Secondly, states do not have clear retaliation strategies against cyber or space attacks. This creates a situation where decision-makers are unsure of possible policy options and responses to any such attack. Such ambiguity serves as a double-edged sword. It can create a perception of severe retaliation in the adversary’s mind, deterring them from conducting any misadventure in new tech domains. At the same time, it can make the adversary doubt the credibility of retaliation, prompting escalation in modern tech warfare domains.
The third major challenge is the dearth of defined thresholds in cyberspace and outer space, making it difficult to establish the red lines that would necessitate any retort. There is a lack of consensus on what type and severity of cyberattack or attack on space-based assets count as violating the sovereignty of a state and warrant a response.
Fourth, the blurred distinction between civilian and military targets in the cyber and space domains presents additional challenges. Disruption of any commercial satellite or cyberattack on public infrastructure like electric grids has more impact on the civilian population. It can compromise public data and impose high costs while disrupting day-to-day communication and navigation. At the same time, such attacks can disrupt military satellite communication networks and power supply. Furthermore, the dual-use nature of cyber and space capabilities further complicates deterrence, bringing into question the intentions of states developing cyber and space capabilities.
The rapid pace with which modern technologies continue to evolve makes strategic planning challenging. The gap between policymakers’ technical knowledge and unprecedented tech inventions continues to expand, challenging effective deterrence against cyber and space threats. National policies and legal frameworks cannot keep up with the capabilities, severity, and methods of attacks using emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), which leaves decision-makers ill-equipped to grasp the consequences of such attacks.
The increasing use of cyberspace, outer space, and AI as force multipliers is already apparent in modern warfighting, as evident in cyber operations during the Russia-Ukraine war, the India-Pakistan May 2025 standoff, and the Iran-US-Israel war. This calls for global engagement for the establishment of regulatory frameworks in the emerging technological domains. The lack of uncontested and unified global cyber and space norms and confidence-building measures weakens deterrence among states. It raises the risk of below-threshold yet destructive attacks that threaten global peace and increase the risk of escalation. Cross-domain deterrence in the cyber and space domains can be strengthened if retaliation strategies and red lines are clearly established. The issue of attribution is expected to persist, but deterrence by denial through robust cybersecurity, better cyber forensics for attribution, and strengthening defense of outer space assets can improve deterrence in these domains. Establishing a clear tiered response system based on the severity of a potential attack can also enhance credibility. Finally, the unique challenges posed by the extension of war into cyber and space domains require the establishment of clear global norms regarding unacceptable behavior in these domains and legitimate responses to them. The progress in this regard has been limited so far and requires a collective effort and political will to address the challenges.
This article was published by the Centre for Strategic and Contemporary Research (CSCR) in another form at https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/defense-security/challenges-to-cross-domain-deterrence-in-the-cyber-and-space-domains/
Misbah Zainab is an MPhil scholar of International Relations at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, and an intern at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.
