According to reports from Indian media, India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is modifying its Agni-V missile, capable of delivering nuclear and conventional warheads, into a bunker buster missile. According to the same reports, this bunker buster missile development is aimed at destroying underground enemy targets, including their command-and-control structures, missile silos, storage depots, and critical military infrastructure. The following article examines the implications of the bunker buster bomb on the fragile strategic environment of South Asia.
The under development modified Agni-V would carry a payload between 7500-8000 Kilograms to 2500-3500 kilometers with a speed of 8-20 Mach and could penetrate 80-100 meters deep inside concrete infrastructure. It may be noted that the standard Agni-V could carry a payload of 1650 Kilograms to 5000-8000 kilometers and lacked a penetration feature. Due to increased payload capacity for deep penetrating strikes, the modified version would cover less distance. Right now, DRDO is developing two types of warheads. The first would be an “airburst warhead†aimed at destroying the above-ground targets or the entry point of the underground facility. The second is the “deep penetrator warheadâ€, designed to penetrate deep inside an underground facility and destroy it.
The rationale for the development of this bunker buster came after a recent American attack on the Iranian nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan, with a bunker buster bomb delivered by a B-2 Spirit bomber. In contrast, the Indian Air Force (IAF), constrained by the absence of advanced operational proficiency for conducting deep penetration missions, as proved during the May 2025 India-Pakistan crisis, has prompted Indian defence planners to pursue an alternative delivery method i.e. a modified Agni-V.
The concerning part of this ongoing development is that during the May 2025 crisis, Indian media established a narrative that India had attacked Pakistan’s underground nuclear facility at Kirana Hills, situated near Sargodha. Later, an Indian Air Force officer, Air Marshal A K Bharti, categorically denied any Indian attack on Pakistan’s nuclear facility at Kirana Hills. However, Indian mainstream media, retired military officials, and government-funded think tanks are still adhering to the narrative of an attack on an underground nuclear installation.
India’s modus operandi involves first constructing a fictional narrative, using its media, about an event that never occurred. Then, years later, its military executes a military action that fits the contours of that pre-established fiction. For instance, in 2016, India claimed that its military had conducted surgical strikes across the Line of Control (LOC) on so-called terrorist camps. In contrast, there were no surgical strikes, except for cross-border firing. Similarly, in 2019, India established a narrative that it conducted airstrikes against terrorist hideouts inside Pakistan while Indian fighter jets remained only a few seconds in Pakistan’s airspace, dropped the payloads harmlessly in the forest and bolted back. In May 2025, the Indian Air Force conducted air strikes while remaining in its airspace on madrasas situated adjacent to mosques inside Pakistan, falsely labelling them as militant training centers. Since 2016, the Indian media has sustained this fictional storyline, while its partial manifestation was eventually witnessed in May 2025.
The question therefore arises that if India attacks some underground nuclear facility of Pakistan in the next crisis with a bunker-buster bomb under development, as this narrative has already been established by its media during the post-Pahalgam crisis? Particularly, when the Indian media repeatedly draws analogies between the American attack on Iranian underground nuclear facilities and India attacking Pakistan’s and China’s underground nuclear facilities.
India’s pursuit of a bunker buster missile signifies its counterforce preemptive aspirations. This development would be perceived as a direct threat to the survivability of its deterrent forces by Pakistan, thereby increasing the risk of inadvertent escalation. If India thinks it could attack an underground Pakistani military purpose nuclear facility with a conventional hypersonic missile and it will not cross the nuclear threshold, such thinking by a nuclear weapon state is fundamentally flawed. From Pakistan’s perspective, such an act might be a nuclear threshold already and compel Pakistan to opt for its nuclear option, particularly when Pakistan is not adhering to the No First Use (NFU) nuclear posture. This development could even compel Pakistan to explore its preemptive option due to the fear of decapitation.
India’s bunker buster quest does not just introduce destabilising elements into the already fragile crisis stability equation of South Asia but also has the potential to initiate a new arms race. This development also undermines the foundational rationale behind the India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement of 1988, though it only covers declared civilian nuclear facilities, not military facilities. However, the core intent of this agreement was to reduce nuclear-conventional entanglement during a crisis due to its escalatory nature.
Pakistan is not the first nuclear weapon state that is compelled by its adversary nuclear weapon state into a lose-it or use-it dilemma with the development of non-nuclear strategic weapons aimed at decapacitating it. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union both faced the same dilemma. However, after certain deliberation, both states came up with three key ideas. First and foremost, hardening the nuclear facilities and assets with layered defence systems to an extent that enemy forces cannot take them out in a conventional strike. Second, developing sea-based survivable nuclear assets, nuclear-powered and nuclear-tipped ballistic missile submarines (SSBNS). Due to their inherent survivability, submarines significantly disincentivise the enemy from taking risky actions against nuclear assets and installations with conventional forces. Third, arms control as a confidence-building measure (CBM). CBMs not just reduce the trust deficit among adversaries but also develop understanding and predictability in the relationship. However, in the India-Pakistan case, arms control has usually remained elusive due to India’s consistent rejection of CBMs proposed by Pakistan.
In South Asia, Pakistan has consistently adopted a balanced and responsible approach to nuclear deterrence, emphasizing survivability, prioritizing stability and practicing restraint. While India is pursuing bunker buster development with counterforce preemption and decapitation capabilities, Pakistan remains firmly committed to its Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) Posture. This strategic force posture ensures that any form of aggression, whether sub-conventional, conventional or nuclear, from the adversary will be met with a timely, proportionate, measured and assured response aimed at restoring deterrence across all spectrums of the conflict. Pakistan’s response to Indian aggression after the Pahalgam incident reflects this commitment. Though Indian actions continuously inject instability into the already fragile strategic environment of the region, Pakistan’s actions and its strategic force posture have been aimed at preserving strategic stability in South Asia. However, Pakistan’s restraint must not be mistaken for weakness. If India continues on the path of provocations by undermining the crisis stability of the region, maintaining a meaningful strategic stability in South Asia will become increasingly difficult.
This article was published in another form at https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/defense-security/indias-bunker-buster-ploy-implications-for-south-asian-strategic-dynamics/
Fakhar Alam is Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.
