A prominent scholar of international security, Vipin Narang, has recently claimed in his co-authored article that Pakistan is developing Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) with a range that could reach the American mainland. Similarly, in December 2024, the United States sanctioned Pakistani entities for alleged assistance in developing long-range missiles (most probably ICBMs) that could easily hit US territory. The following article critically examines the political objectives behind Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and evaluates publicly available data on the country’s technical capabilities to analyse the recent claims of Pakistan developing long-range missiles or ICBMs capable of striking the American mainland.
Historically, Pakistan’s quest for nuclear weapons began in the early 70s, following a war in 1971 that separated East Pakistan and then India’s nuclear tests in 1974. This was the time when Pakistan realized that only nuclear weapons could assure it the ultimate security against its conventionally superior and hostile neighbour, India. This conclusion was not just rational but also politically logical; what would any other country have thought of after losing a large portion of its land? Since then, India has been the only factor that has dictated the nuclear force posture of Pakistan.
In that regard, Pakistan has tested the Shaheen III missile, its longest-range missile capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads, and has a declared range of 2750 km, covering India till its Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Pakistan believes that the Shaheen III missile, along with its other Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) and Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs), is credible enough to deter Indian aggression. Pakistan’s existing nuclear capabilities have credibly raised the cost of aggression for India to such a level that it has deterred India from initiating a major military offensive against Pakistan like the one Russia launched against Ukraine in 2022 or Israel launched against Iran in 2025. Therefore, the decision made by Pakistan’s national security elites in the 1970s has ensured strategic stability in South Asia.
However, hypothetically, in the future with changing geopolitical dynamics, if India threatens Pakistan from its military bases outside India and Pakistan’s national security leadership decides to deter those threats, Pakistan will need a missile with a maximum range of 5500 km. This missile would credibly deter any attack on the Pakistani mainland from Indian bases in Tajikistan (Farkhor Air Base) (900 km from Islamabad), Bhutan (IMTRAT) (1620 km from Lahore), and facilities in Oman-Duqm (1250 Km from Karachi), Seychelles (3520 Km from Karachi), Mauritius (5150 km from Karachi) and Madagascar (5320 km from Karachi). But even then, India would be the only factor in those calculations.
Any missile that could reach the American mainland from Pakistan must have a range of more than 12000 km. Even that hypothetical missile would be less than half of what is needed to reach the US mainland. It would be irrational and a waste of resources for Pakistan to develop any missile with a range that has no political purpose for the country.
This range limitation of Pakistan is also rooted in its rocket motor technology. Technically, rocket motors act as the heart of a missile system. The larger the diameter of a rocket motor, the greater the distance a missile covers. So far, Pakistan has developed a rocket motor with 1.4 meters of diameter, and the Shaheen III missile uses this rocket motor. For a missile to cover a distance of more than 12000 km (distance from Pakistan to the US), this much diameter of a rocket motor is far less.
Minimally, Pakistan would need to develop rocket motors with having diameter between 2 to 2.3 meters so its missile can reach the American mainland. Interestingly, there is no publicly available data published by any source that claims that Pakistan has developed rocket motors that have a diameter of more than 1.4 meters. However, in future, if Pakistan tests a rocket motor having a diameter more than 1.4 meters, it will be either for its space program or for enhancing terminal manoeuvring, boosting acceleration, improving the ballistic trajectory and having additional space for advanced guidance systems of its current missile systems.
Contrary to this, according to international sources, India has not just successfully tested rocket motors that have a diameter of 2.8 meters. But it is also developing a four-stage intercontinental range missile, projected to have a striking range between 12000 to 16000 km, making the American mainland well within its reach.
In international politics, there are no permanent friends or enemies; rather, national interest remains the foremost consideration for every country. What if, in the future, the US and India relations diverge due to conflicting national interests? What will America do about the Indian missiles having the American mainland within reach? Why did Vipin Narang, despite his loyalty to American strategic thinking, never openly raise this issue in any of his writings? During the Cold War and the war against terror, America never perceived Pakistan’s capabilities as a direct threat, but with changing geopolitical dynamics, America has started perceiving a direct threat from Pakistan’s alleged capabilities. Simultaneously, what if, in the future, due to some geopolitical shifts, America starts perceiving itself threatened by India’s capabilities? What will America do then?
For Pakistan, an ICBM carries no strategic utility within the framework of its existing strategic force posture. The development of an ICBM would be incongruent with both the operational logic and doctrinal principles that underpin Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence strategy, which remains fundamentally India-centric and only regionally focused. Integrating an ICBM into its force structure would require a fundamental revision of Pakistan’s national security strategy and a comprehensive reorientation of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine. Particularly, Pakistan would need to expand its deterrence objectives far beyond the current declared scope. Politically and economically, Pakistan cannot afford this reorientation at least in the foreseeable future. Hence, the concern that Pakistan is developing an ICBM is far different from the conclusions made by other scholars. Any rational and unbiased scholar could easily conclude that right now, an ICBM is neither the need nor the priority of Pakistan, and there is no sign of Pakistan developing long-range missiles or ICBMs. There exists no publicly verified evidence for that; only speculative claims exist. Pakistan’s complete missile inventory is focused against India, and Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is also only India-centric. Pakistan’s strategic force posture is centred around Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD), and it did not envision global power projection; thus, there exists no strategic rationale behind Pakistan developing an ICBM.
This article was published in another form at https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/07/26/is-pakistan-developing-an-intercontinental-ballistic-missile/
Fakhar Alam is Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.
