India, the seventh nuclear power in the world, is striving to become a regional power. A survey conducted by the Stimson Center between April and May this year showed that around 68% of Indian nationals supported India having more nuclear weapons than its adversaries. Per the Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates, India currently has around 160 nuclear weapons and is continuously focused on stockpiling its nuclear material. The US-Indo civil nuclear deal signed in October 2008 strengthened the enhancement of Indian defence posture. The rivalry and hostile relations between India and China and between India and Pakistan are fundamental aspects of the Indian possession of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons, since their inception, have been considered the best tools of national security. Yet, countries and nations that desire to enhance their nuclear weaponry also need to ensure the existence of robust security mechanisms. The capability of nuclear weaponry could be considered a tool of long-term peace, particularly between the conflicting states, as has been experienced during the Cold War era. However, the spread of nuclear weapons could pose a serious threat to global peace with regard to nuclear incidents and accidents, thefts, and the unauthorised use of force.

Proliferation risks and unlawful use of nuclear material and associated technology have long been an international concern due to the dangers it presents to international security and stability. Since nuclear security is a global concern, its imperatives are a mix of tangible and intangible aspects to ensure nuclear security responsibilities. INFCIRC 225/Rev.5 indicates that “physical protection” has been used to describe what is now known as nuclear security. Also, nuclear security is more comprehensive than physical protection, as physical protection can be considered a subset of nuclear security.

In South Asia, Pakistan and India have put in place crucial mechanisms and management strategies to ensure rigorous nuclear safety and security for the overall management of their nuclear capabilities and infrastructure. As per the nuclear security learning curve, there are critical factors to analyse South Asia’s nuclear security mechanisms. These factors include the evolving and dynamic regional security environment and dealing with stockpiles of fissile material for civilian and military purposes.

The recurring incidents of security lapses, including the theft of enrichment material, clearly indicate that India’s security mechanism and nuclear doctrine have serious loopholes, which should be a concern for the international community.

Hence, against this backdrop, various nuclear experts are apprehensive that besides India’s gradual technological advancement of military equipment, it lacks sufficient security measures for its nuclear arsenal and related material. India, aspiring for a leading role in South Asia as well as in the international realm, has experienced many nuclear accidents in the past, that include the lapses in Kalpakkam nuclear power generation in 1987, Tarapur nuclear power plant in 1989 and 1992, Narora fire incident in 1993, Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS) leakage incident in 1995, Kalpakkam incident in 2002, and Mayapuri incident in 2010. The security of nuclear material is, however, not limited to the power reactors only, as India has a track record of various nuclear material theft incidents since the early 1990s, other than the above-stated accidents.

The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) strictly holds to the legal obligations of the safety and protection of nuclear material during transportation or storageAs a signatory of CPPNM since 2002 and 2005, it is the prime responsibility of India to ensure robust security mechanisms, particularly in dealing with sensitive material. However, over the last three decades, more than 20 attempts of theft of uranium and radioactive-like material have been reported from India.

Despite lapses, India does not seem to focus enough on safeguarding its nuclear arsenal and related material. Theft of uranium and related materials is becoming a common trend in the country. The most recent incident of uranium theft in India was reported in February this year when two Indians were arrested in Nepal for possessing a uranium-like substance. The frequent theft of uranium-like material and leakages of the radioactive material can have grave security and safety repercussions which cannot be ignored at any stage.

Thus, nuclear security culture is of utmost importance to which India ostensibly adheres. However, it has significantly failed to protect its nuclear power plants and combat the illicit trafficking of uranium and radioactive material that has been caught several times. Additionally, as per the joint agreement concluded between India and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2009, India has around twenty-two nuclear power reactors, out of which eight nuclear power reactors are not within the scope of IAEA safeguards.

The recurring incidents of security lapses, including the theft of enrichment material, clearly indicate that India’s security mechanism and nuclear doctrine have serious loopholes, which should be a concern for the international community. Moreover, if these lapses persist, they can continue to pose a devastating nuclear threat to the entire region. This enrichment material can always land in the hands of illicit entities or non-state actors, particularly when India is already facing numerous insurgencies in its various areas. Likewise, such lapses in the nuclear domain do not show India as a responsible nuclear state; hence the Indian desire to emerge as a regional power is debatable.

This article was published in the Centre for Strategic and Contemporary Research (CSCR) on October 5, 2022.  https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/defense-security/evaluating-nuclear-security-in-india/

 

Dr. Rahat Iqbal

Dr. Rahat Iqbal is currently working as an Associate Director in Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) Islamabad.

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Dr. Rahat Iqbal is Associate Director Research at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad. She holds a PhD in International Relations from the University of Peshawar and brings extensive experience in research, program design, and policy analysis. Her key interests include nuclear safety and security, peaceful uses of nuclear technology, arms control, and geopolitics.

Mr Syed Ali Abbas

Research Officer/ Comm Officer/ Managing Editor CISS Insight

Syed Ali Abbas is a Research Officer/Communication Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad. Previously, he served as an associate editor at Indus News Network. His areas of interest include Middle East politics, military modernization, foreign policy, and nuclear politics. He has contributed to various platforms, including The National Interest, South Asian Voices, and others.

Dr Anum Riaz

Associate Director Research

Dr. Anum Riaz is the Associate Director Research at the Center for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Department of Political Science at Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan. She also possesses M.Phil. and M.Sc. degrees from the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. Additionally, she has taught BS and Master’s students at the Department of Political Science at Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan. Her areas of interest include strategic studies, international relations, international nuclear politics, the nuclear non-proliferation regime, arms control and disarmament, as well as traditional and non-traditional security issues.

Dr Bilal Zubair

Director Research

Dr. Bilal Zubair has worked as an Assistant Professor at the National Defence University Islamabad and Lecturer at the National University of Science and Technology. He holds a Ph.D. and M. Phil. in International Relations from Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad. Dr. Zubair is author of the book Chinese Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in the United States (Palgrave Macmillan, 2024) and contributed to several journal articles and book chapters focusing on soft power, diplomacy, and China’s role in international relations.

His research has been published in various academic journals, and he has presented at international conferences Dr. Zubair has also been an active reviewer and editorial board member. His professional interests include great power politics, and the role of communication in global diplomacy.

Mr Mobeen Jafar Mir

Research Officer

Mobeen Jafar Mir is a Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad. His research focuses on U.S. foreign policy, particularly in the areas of strategy, technology, and arms control. He is currently pursuing an M.Phil. in International Relations at the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He can be found on Twitter @jafar_mobeen.

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