The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook 2025: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security has laid out developments in military expenditures, technological trends and arms production. The chapter titled “World nuclear forces” shows an increase in Indian nuclear weapons. The study reveals that India has around 190 nuclear warheads as compared with approximately 180 in the previous SIPRI assessment, while continuing to modernise its strategic forces. Beyond the modernization of the number of warheads, the new modernization also includes advanced delivery systems, new technologies and improved capabilities. The developments are part of a wider move to modernize India’s strategic stance, focusing on enhancing deterrence through technological advancements and versatility. This article argues that the growing number of nuclear weapons and sophistication of strategic forces in India is altering the deterrence calculus, sharpening strategic competition, and raising new challenges to crisis stability in South Asia.
Beyond expanding its nuclear arsenal, India is investing in a range of advanced strategic capabilities. Recent advancements include testing of Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology, further development of longer-range ballistic missiles, an increase in Indian nuclear submarines, rail-based nuclear weapon testing, and deployment of long-range sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). Collectively, these developments demonstrate that India’s modernization strategy is increasingly focused on enhancing the survivability, flexibility, and effectiveness of its strategic forces.
One important challenge in South Asia is how such capabilities impact strategic perceptions. How adversaries interpret military assets is as important as the assets themselves for deterrence. As one state gains more accurate delivery systems, builds more robust command structures and demonstrates more flexibility of operations, the other state is likely to reassess the strategic balance of the two. Such perceptions can have an impact on defence planning, even if there is no immediate threat of conflict.
The development of MIRV technology is a case in point. MIRV technology allows a single ballistic missile to carry multiple independently targetable warheads, enabling simultaneous strikes against different targets. The successful test of the MIRV-equipped Agni-V ballistic missile by India in March 2024 underscored the nation’s strategic prowess and precision long-range strike capabilities. In addition to increasing operational flexibility, MIRV technology also makes it harder to intercept ballistic missile defence because it allows for multiple warheads to be launched on separate paths, which makes them harder to intercept. These capabilities can also enhance counterforce options by enabling more precise attacks on an adversary’s strategic assets while maintaining adequate warhead numbers to deter an enemy. From Pakistan’s point of view, these developments, along with India’s ongoing investments in ballistic missile defence, hypersonic weapons and advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, instil doubts that India’s force structure may be evolving towards a counterforce posture incrementally over time. This type of perception, regardless of actual intent, can further exacerbate strategic competition and reduce crisis stability in South Asia.
India’s sea-based nuclear capability also needs to be taken into consideration. It is building a fleet of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), which helps to improve the survivability of its second-strike capability, an important aspect of credible deterrence. However, once more capable sea-based nuclear forces come into the picture, there is more complexity in crisis management. During a crisis, it is harder to distinguish between conventional and nuclear operations of naval forces. Some doubts about submarine operations and anti-submarine warfare may increase the chances of miscalculations, particularly in the northern Indian Ocean, where both nations are beefing up their maritime operations.
India’s investments in developing its advanced conventional capabilities also influence the strategic environment. The increase in defence spending has facilitated the purchase of advanced combat aircraft, long-range precision strike systems, integrated air and land missile defence systems, and hypersonic weapons. These perceptions may lead both sides to increase their force posture, creating an action-reaction circle, thereby raising strategic competition.
An example of this challenge is ballistic missile defence (BMD). While it is impossible for any missile defence system to provide absolute security in the event of a nuclear attack, having a missile defence system can have an impact on strategic thinking. If one side believes that part of an adversary’s retaliatory capability can be intercepted, the other may respond by increasing the penetration capability, number and survivability of its strategic forces. It does not always lead to more security, however, but to an ongoing process of military adaptation. The same is true for the development of hypersonic weapons, which will shorten warning times and make it harder to make early-warning and decision-making during crises.
The development of the Agni-VI missile is the latest step in India’s strategic modernization efforts. The Agni-VI, which is expected to be able to carry multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), may improve India’s flexibility of strikes and payload, as compared to its predecessors. If operationalized, these capabilities would reinforce perceptions of a more sophisticated, survivable, and flexible nuclear force. From a deterrence point of view, this will enhance India’s second strike capability, while adding additional uncertainties to the strategic landscape in the region. These developments could signal a transition towards more advanced and potentially destabilizing strategic capabilities, heightening strategic rivalry and deterrence dynamics in South Asia, especially for neighbouring nations like Pakistan.
The developments have significant implications for Pakistan’s deterrence posture. Pakistan has always maintained its security policy of credible minimum deterrence and not numerical parity. But deterrence is not a static concept. The changing nature of military technologies causes states to evaluate their existing military capabilities against the need for strategic stability. It is therefore possible that India’s ongoing modernization will have an impact on Pakistan’s defence planning, which is seeking to preserve the credibility of its deterrent in a changed strategic environment.
The military modernization and, advanced strategic technologies and conventional military expansion, have a cumulative impact on the complexity of crisis management. A future crisis is unlikely to resemble those of previous years. New technologies that enable greater use of real-time intelligence, precision-strike and quick decision-making can shorten the time for political leaders to take in information and manage escalation. In such an environment, misperception or technical error would have serious strategic consequences even if neither side wants to start a major conflict.
Therefore, as the military continues to be modernised, strategic risk reduction mechanisms should be improved. The enhancement of crisis communication mechanisms, strategic stability and nuclear risk-reduction measures are still key elements in bilateral dialogue aimed at enhancing the predictability of nuclear situations. As both countries are ramping up their presence in the Indian Ocean, maritime confidence-building measures are also critical. A more open attitude towards military doctrines and technologies would also help to minimize the risk of misunderstanding during times of heightened tension. India’s military modernization is reshaping the strategic landscape of South Asia. The question is not so much whether India should modernize its armed forces, but what the net effect of all these capabilities will be on regional deterrence and crisis stability. Sustainable regional security will not rely on military superiority, but on maintaining strategic restraint and enhancing crisis-management capabilities and credible deterrence on both sides. If these are not considered, future crises may be more challenging to handle and strategic stability may become more vulnerable to technological competition, as it may be more difficult to maintain.
This article was published by Global Defense Insight in another form at https://defensetalks.com/how-indias-military-modernization-is-impacting-strategic-stability-in-south-asia/
Shahwana Binte Sohail is is Research Assistant at the Centre for International Strategic Studies Islamabad.
