The evolution of Indian naval doctrine can be studied by the Holmes and Yoshihara model. India declared its first naval doctrine in 2004, following the free-rider model, where India recognizes the Indian Ocean Region as a key maritime trade route. The Indian doctrine evolved into the constable model of Holmes and Yoshihara, where India broadened its primary interests and emphasised military capabilities to fulfil these interests. In the third stage, India’s naval doctrine followed the strongman model, where it sought to achieve security and dominance in the IOR. This phase is exaggerated by India’s role as a “Net Security Provider.†The primary objective of the maritime doctrine was to achieve an assured second-strike capability. India’s naval developments in sea-based nuclear capabilities represent a major leap forward. New Delhi completed its nuclear triad in August 2016, by deploying nuclear-powered submarines (SSBNs) INS Arihant to the Indian Ocean.
Indian Naval Modernisation: Offensive or Defensive?
The Indian Ocean Region is strategically important because it is the route for 80% of maritime transportation. Indian naval expansion and intensified nuclearisation in this region are reinforced by Indian Naval Modernisation 2030. It includes various advancements, such as the development of flagship aircraft carriers (INS Vikrant, INS Vishal), naval warships, UAVs and submarine fleet. Indian naval modernisation is aimed at strengthening the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad that is considered to be the most survivable, and manifested through the Arihant-class SSBN program. India is aiming to establish a fleet of at least 6 SSBNs, including INS Aridhaman. These submarines can carry nuclear-tipped Submarines-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). The K series of missiles includes K-15 Sagarika, K-4, K-5 and K-6, ranging from 700-6000+ kilometres, which have an intercontinental range.
India justifies the nuclearisation of the Indian Ocean by giving Cold War-era logic: assured second strike capability ensures deterrence. The Indian maritime security strategy 2015 declared SSBNs as instruments of “assured punitive retaliation†as they are less vulnerable and have stealth and mobility. However, it is a dangerous illusion, especially when one adversary has the capability and the other does not. The Cuban Missile Crisis is a reminder that the world almost came to the verge of nuclear fallout despite of Second-Strike capabilities of both adversaries. Moreover, the South Asian security matrix is even more complex. Geographical proximity, history of conflicts, unresolved disputes and lack of functional diplomatic channels complicate the situation. In a trust-deficient environment where India is not ready to talk to Pakistan, India’s second-strike capability is not the guarantor of peace but an impetus for a nuclear arms race under the sea.
Indian Nuclear Sea Leg and Crises Instability
In the aftermath of the recent Pahalgam incident, India launched its false-flag Operation Sindoor against Pakistan and deployed its Navy’s Carrier Battle Group, including the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant (R11), Visakhapatnam-class destroyers, Talwar-class frigates, submarines, and naval aviation assets. The Indian Sea leg of the nuclear triad is a factor of instability during crises, opposite to the deterrence claim. The operation of a credible SSBN faces an always/never dilemma: nuclear weapons must always be ready to launch but never be launched without authorisation. In India, SSBNs operate with mated warheads (missiles with pre-installed warheads). The threat looming around Indian nuclear submarines is the hypocrisy in the Nuclear Command and Control (NC2) system of Indian SSBNs. They claim to have a central civilian NC2; however, in a crisis, there is a probability of shifting to a delegatory NC2. In both cases, there is a lot of stress on the effective communication system that may fail or be disrupted. Furthermore, the contemporary Indian government is far-right extremist, driven by Hindutva ideology. Modi equating internal terrorist activities with a war on a sovereign state cannot be trusted to take a rational decision for launching sea-based nuclear weapons. Even the delegatory system puts the decision in the hands of an officer, which is no less risky. In both cases, ideology-driven government and security forces enhance the probability of nuclear crises in South Asia.
A Global Threat Beneath the Waves
The Indian Ocean Region is one of the busiest maritime corridors, so Indian nuclear deployment beneath the waves is a lurking global threat. IOR hosts international navies like the U.S., China, Russia and others, and the increasing presence of nuclear vessels augments the probability of inadvertent escalation, confrontation and misidentification. Moreover, in the case of a strategic crisis in the IOR, two-thirds of the global trade will be halted. Economic insecurity in the IOR region has increased because of India’s rationale of sea-based deterrence.
India was at a threshold alliance with the U.S in the maritime strategic domain, by which the US declared India as “A net security provider” in the IOR. However, this status does not guarantee that India will be there to help the US when the need arises. This strategic posture has encouraged India to pursue naval modernisation in recent decades. Indian naval modernisation is not only being evaded from scrutiny but is also being systematically promoted by the West despite its clear risks, which undermines global arms control norms.
Indian nuclearisation of the Indian Ocean has implications for Pakistan. In the past, Pakistan also advocated for a peaceful and nuclear-weapons-free Indian Ocean. Pakistan also proposed a bilateral ban on SSBNs after the nuclear tests in India and Pakistan. Due to growing Indian naval modernisation and nuclearisation, Pakistan established the Naval Strategic Forces Command (NSFC) as a custodian of Pakistan’s sea-based deterrence. In 2017, Pakistan tested Babur III, a Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) with a 450 km range. To secure its seas and keep India in check and ensure the survivability of its nuclear weapons, Pakistan maintains limited but credible minimum deterrence in the Indian Ocean. South Asian security and stability cannot be achieved if some states are treated with nuclear exceptionalism. This special treatment of India compels Pakistan to ensure second strike capability by developing SSBNs. In a nutshell, the Indian Sea leg of the nuclear triad may be silent beneath the waves, but its implications are loud and clear at the regional and global levels. Indian naval modernisation is cloaked in strategic terminologies like deterrence; however, it is altering the Indian Ocean Region into a nuclear theatre. Instead of assuring stability and deterrence, these developments fuel instability and an arms race. The Indian Hindutva-driven government and security forces strain the command-and-control system that prevents a nuclear catastrophe. Indian naval modernisation is a threat to the economic, strategic, and environmental security of the region. Pakistan’s national security is at risk because of the IOR nuclearisation. Although Pakistan stands for making the Indian Ocean Region a Nuclear Free Zone (NFZ), it has established credible minimum deterrence. Pakistan strongly urges its stance but continues to establish credible deterrence to ensure stability in this region.
This article was published in another form at https://strafasia.com/indias-sea-based-nuclear-submarines-ssbns-a-lurking-threat-beneath-the-waves/
Areesha Manzoor is Research Assistant at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.
