Abstract
The security architecture of South Asia is fundamentally different from that of the Cold War era. During the Cold War, the two competing powers, the U.S. and the USSR, were geographically distant from each other. This lack of proximity between their strategic centers reduced the chances of crisis instability, miscalculation, and escalation crisis. In contrast, South Asia’s geographic contiguity, particularly between India and Pakistan, places their strategic centers in close proximity, significantly increasing the risk of crisis instability. India’s sea-based deterrent poses serious concerns for the region for two main reasons. First, the independent command and control system of SSBNs raises the issue of pre-delegation, especially if communication between the SSBNs and political leadership on land breaks down during a crisis. In such a scenario, it is unclear whether the SSBNs’ autonomous command and control system would be capable of accurately interpreting the situation. Second, India’s SSBNs, armed with sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with intercontinental ranges, not only trigger an arms race within South Asia but may escalate strategic competition beyond the region. This research paper tries to critically discuss India’s sea-based deterrence under the shadow of its touted no-first-use policy. India’s doctrinal shift from countervalue second strike to counterforce stance, considering its SSBNs development. Moreover, the ranges and capability of India’s SLBMs will be discussed through the lens of India’s pursuit of prestige, and global strategic ambitions.
This resarcher paper was published by The Regional Tribune Vol. 5 No. 1 (2026) and can be read at https://submissions.regionaltribune.com/index.php/trt/article/view/214
Mr Murad Ali is a Research Officer at Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad
Ms Nawal Nawaz is Research Assistant at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.
