With the expiry of the New START treaty on February 5, 2026, the last legally binding constraint on nuclear arsenals between the United States and Russia has lapsed, potentially destabilizing the strategic balance between the two powers. New START that was signed in April 8, 2010 aimed to halt the development and fielding of new delivery system and the deployment of additional nuclear warheads to existing delivery systems. This Bilateral arms control agreement between the US and Russia has served as the cornerstone of global nuclear restraint for nearly two decades. Both the Washington and Moscow have combined 80 percent of worlds nuclear warheads. This arms control framework provided numerical ceiling, transparency, predictability and ensured verification mechanism between Washington and Moscow. While verification activities under New START were halted during the pandemic and compliance disputes later eroded its operational vitality, the treaty nonetheless constrained deployed strategic arsenals within agreed ceilings and sustained a framework for strategic dialogue. In absence of such transparency and numerical ceiling, the global nuclear order enters a period of uncertainty.
The loss of mutual visibility has become a great concern after the expiry of New START between US and Russia. In absence of such intrusive verification, strategic planners are compelled to operate under worst-case assumptions, breeding arms race. Both Washington and Moscow are already engaged in nuclear force modernization, making the time of expiry of New START a major concern for future of arms control. Emerging technologies that involve hypersonic delivery systems and space-based assets are already complicating deterrence equation. In an era increasingly driven by automation, Strategic stability depends less on numerical parity and more on avoiding mistakes, miscalculations and accidental escalations. Although certain transparency and confidence-building measures exist, emerging technological domains remain only partially integrated into formal arms control regimes, prompting debate within forums such as the Conference on Disarmament regarding the future viability of traditional arms control models.
The expiry of New START treaty has ramifications well beyond the US-Russia bilateral relations. The broader architecture of non-proliferation is weakened with the end of formal arms control arrangement, understating global confidence in nuclear restraint. Major powers have not fulfilled their disarmament obligations, and this lack of adherence with disarmament obligations has been repeatedly questioned by the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS).
Though, Moscow has extended a modest proposal in October 2025 to Washington to extend compliance with central quantitative limits set under the New START for a year; yet, the issue of resumption of data exchanges and inspections of the strategic systems between the two sides disrupted further negotiations on extension of New START. The expiry of New START clearly shows that Moscow and Washington have no appetite for a renewed bilateral framework. In such challenging times, world can consider more inclusive arrangements that could also consider additional nuclear stakeholders.
The erosion of bilateral strategic arms control constraints under New START is occurring alongside renewed uncertainty surrounding global nuclear testing norms. While New START imposed quantitative limits on deployed strategic warheads and delivery systems, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) sought to constrain qualitative advancements by prohibiting explosive nuclear testing. Although the United States, Russia, and China have observed testing moratoria since 1996, renewed debate in Washington about potential test resumption has raised concerns about reciprocal actions by Moscow and Beijing.
Furthermore, future of arms control must evolve beyond cold war concepts. The focal points of future arms control framework must stand on the responsible application of AI to nuclear command systems, greater transparency in hypersonic testing and the assurance of robust space-based early warning capabilities rather than mere counting of warheads. With the demise of the final and sole pillar of bilateral nuclear restraint between the United States and Russia, there are risks that number could exceed 1550 warhead limit set under the treaty, destabilizing mutual balance of terror between Russian and US strategic forces. For the first time in 35 years, the US and Russia are not constrained in deployment of strategic arsenals by uploading additional warheads on existing bombers and missiles, reversing decades of work to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Therefore, the Absence of bilateral strategic arms control framework such as New START, destabilizes today’s multi-polar nuclear order, affecting threat perceptions and force postures in nuclear dyads beyond Europe and transatlantic space.
This article was published in another form at https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/02/24/nuclear-without-limits-the-new-arms-race/
Ms Nawal Nawaz is Research Assistant at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.
