The decision by India to place the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in abeyance has transformed the treaty from a water-sharing agreement into a test of strategic stability in South Asia. The treaty, once seen as a technical document to deal with the management of shared rivers, is now more influenced by geopolitical rivalry, loss of political trust, and growing securitisation of water. So, its future will not be as much dependent upon hydrology or law as upon the ability of India and Pakistan to maintain one of the last few institutionalised channels of communication in an increasingly hostile relationship.
The IWT was agreed upon to take care of the equitable utilisation of the Indus system and not be affected by the larger political differences between India and Pakistan. But it has slowly become a subject of geopolitical importance than water allocation. The treaty formed the Permanent Indus Commission, a set-up that institutionalised regular communication between two adversarial states, and a framework for dispute resolution. These mechanisms offered a consistent forum for technical cooperation, even in times of armed conflict and diplomatic impasse, and thus shielded water cooperation from broader political conflicts.
Today, that institutional robustness is more under threat than it ever has been before. The fact that India has kept the treaty in abeyance and has recently demanded a complete renegotiation of the treaty is symptomatic of a new trend in which water is seen as a national security issue. Calls for renegotiating the treaty illustrate how issues once viewed primarily through technical and legal lenses are increasingly being framed in security and geopolitical terms.
Meanwhile, Pakistan has been demanding the observance of the treaty and has stated that any dispute should be handled as per the dispute settlement mechanism outlined in the treaty rather than by unilateral actions. The difference in the two views is indicative of the growing political and security conflicts between India and Pakistan that have affected the future of IWT. The treaty, which had previously been considered more of a technical and institutional solution, is now subject to a more comprehensive political analysis; shifting to a political dimension puts the treaty in danger.
The impacts are not just in the Indus Basin. With the treaty being placed in abeyance, and with one of the last remaining institutional ties with Pakistan broken, the management of any future conflict could become even more challenging, and misunderstandings in future conflicts much more likely. Its decline would thus have implications, not just for water security, but for the larger mechanisms which help to manage the tensions between two atomic weapons states.
The IWT is now confronted with increasing environmental pressures, against the backdrop of diminishing political trust. Undeniably, the pressure on the Indus Basin has increased as a result of climate change, swift population growth and rising demand for agriculture. However, above all, there is a need for technical cooperation to find solutions to these environmental problems. Instead, bilateral relations have been growing more securitised; cooperation is more challenging than ever, and more so when it is most necessary. Even routine issues such as sharing hydrological data and conducting technical consultations are increasingly viewed through a strategic lens, reducing the space for constructive interaction. The paradox is that more institutional coordination is needed to manage the common risks, and political mistrust is a problem for the very mechanisms that are supposed to facilitate institutional coordination.
The reduction in institutional collaboration has ramifications beyond water management. The IWT was considered by many as a classic example of institutional cooperation taking place in spite of geopolitical competition and has been a valuable tool to keep the dialogue between India and Pakistan alive. A lack of this institutional structure may open the door to developing a new model of shared resource management based on strategic competition. If such measures as dialogue and confidence-building are undermined in this area where India and Pakistan are both nuclear powers, it may make future crises more likely.
If the IWT is to continue serving as a stabilising mechanism, its institutional and technical functions must be protected from broader political tensions. The current treaty structure should therefore be reinforced to respond to new challenges in an effective way, without compromising the peace of the region. First, there is a need to revive regular meetings of the Permanent Indus Commission of both countries and enhance the use of the dispute resolution mechanism provided in the treaty. Secondly, regardless of political tensions, continuous technical cooperation on hydrological data, adaptation to climate change and river management is needed. Lastly, both sides should refrain from using water as a weapon for strategic pressure, as doing so could further deteriorate one of the last remaining bilateral channels of communication. The Indus Waters Treaty is at a crossroads more than 60 years after it was signed. More than the language of the provisions, its future will depend on the commitment of India and Pakistan to maintain one of the few institutional arrangements that has survived many political crises before. Perhaps the treaty’s most valuable contribution is that it has provided a forum for dialogue where other means of communication have failed. The most successful aspect of the Indus Waters Treaty has not been the sharing of rivers, but the dialogue. Protecting the waters could be as crucial as protecting that dialogue, especially in an age of escalating strategic tensions. These steps won’t solve the overall India-Pakistan conflict, but they can help minimise the threat posed by water being yet another flash point for regional discord or conflict.
This article was published by the Stratheia Policy Journal in another form at https://stratheia.com/from-water-sharing-to-strategic-stability/
Shahwana Binte Sohail is is Research Assistant at the Centre for International Strategic Studies Islamabad.
