In Exercise Akhand Prahaar, conducted as part of the larger tri-service Exercise Trishul on the western front, Lieutenant General Dhiraj Seth commented during a press briefing that “the time has come to change the Cold Start doctrine into the Cold Strike one.” The statement suggests that the Indian Army is reevaluating the use of force during the initial phases of a crisis against Pakistan. Currently, little publicly available data exists to specify the Cold Strike as an official doctrine. However, exercise observations, efforts to structure forces like the Rudra integrated brigade and statements of senior Indian leadership in the wake of recent crises are indicators of Indian thinking. This article thus considers Cold Strike as a refined version of the Indian Cold Start Doctrine. It analyses how such an approach would unfold in practice, what operational issues it is meant to solve, and how its implementation would influence the dynamics of crisis behaviour and escalation between India and Pakistan.
Cold Start: The Operational Constraint
Cold Start was designed to provide India with the capability to launch limited ground actions at the onset of a crisis, the purpose of delivering military effects before global pressure could limit additional operations. It was based on Integrated Battle Groups based near to Pakistan’s border, a mix of armour, mechanised infantry, artillery, engineers, air defence and logistics in units that were expected to move at short notice. In practice, Cold Start faced long-term operational limitations. These included;
The first was mobilisation time. The forward corps of the Indian Army still relied on the flow of forces and resources from deep reserves to form an effective offensive package, even when the alert levels were comparatively higher. This process entailed the transportation of armour, opening of fuelling and maintenance bases, ammunition storage, placement of air defence resources and pre-positioning of logistics. These preparations could not be easily hidden and could leave visible signs, which could provide Pakistan an early warning and preparation window.
The second limitation was political will. Ground operations between the international border involve risks of escalation in terms of scale and intensity, particularly under conditions of nuclear deterrence. Third, Pakistan responded to Cold Start by inducting a low yield nuclear weapon, Nasr. As a result, Cold Start functioned more as a paper plan than as an employable option during crises, as witnessed during Operation Parakram
Meanwhile, the Cold Strike is currently being framed as an attempt to operate with these constraints. Instead of using visible mobilisation and large ground manoeuvres, it aims to provide political leaders with pre-assembled strike alternatives which can be deployed within a short time and with a smaller initial footprint. The main question is whether this approach can produce the desired effects or create new risks.
Cold Strike: Logic and Components Structural
The military trend indicates that what is being characterized as Cold Strike is based on three broad structural components; establishment of permanently integrated high-readiness formations, use of multi-domain effects, and the use of a targeting approach designed to focus on limited, though operationally significant targets.
The former manifests itself in the creation and use of units such as the Rudra Brigade, under the XII Corps (Konark Corps). The Rudra Brigade was involved in the land manoeuvres during Exercise Akhand Prahaar which was a larger corps-level exercise incorporating mechanised and infantry manoeuvres, aviation assets and supporting arms. Such formations comprise armour, mechanised infantry, artillery, air defence, engineers, signals, electronic warfare elements and organic unmanned systems under one command, unlike traditional brigades which are organised around a single combat arm. The rationale of such an organisational structure is to minimize reliance on mobilisation during crisis and to minimise the time lag between political approval and the use of force. Tasks which involve long preparation time and produce observable signals can, theoretically, be performed faster and less subjectively.
The second aspect is how operations are undertaken across multiple domains. The Indian land warfare doctrine focuses on simultaneity over a strict phasing with effects being applied on land, air, cyber, space and the electromagnetic spectrum. Exercise Akhand Prahaar was a reflection of this strategy with the integrated use of ground forces, Army Aviation attack helicopters, Indian Air Force fighter ground-attack strikes and electronic warfare grids backed by intelligence provided by drones and other unmanned systems. Instead of a set sequence of operations, the exercise focused on coordinating effects in a highly integrated manner across domains. Ground forces, including the Rudra Brigade, operated within this framework to exploit or consolidate effects being generated across the wider battlespace, rather than acting in isolation.
The third aspect is a targeting strategy that will create a few but focused impacts. The Indian land warfare doctrine emphasizes on precision and depth in operation, as the May 2025 crisis showed. However, Exercises like Akhand Prahaar seem to be aimed at legitimizing the capacity to produce focused military effects in a short period of time, while retaining a narrative of control and restraint in its political dimension.
Despite these adaptations, Cold Strike has significant limitations. High-readiness formations that are permanently integrated are ones that are resource intensive and need long term investment in training, maintenance munitions and personnel. The credibility of precision and standoff capabilities relies on availability in exercises, but also the depth of its stockpile, the industrial replenishing capability and its capacity to sustain during an operation. Most importantly, the successful implementation of a multi-domain strategy demands some degree of joint integration among the Army, Air Force and Navy that is not yet balanced, as shown by the slow and contentious development of Indian theatre command reform. These aspects will determine the extent to which Cold Strike can be developed as an exercise-proven concept into a reliable operational plan.
Obstacles to Combat on a Nuclearized Battlespace.
Cold Strike is based on the premise that Pakistan can, and will, be able to differentiate between a limited strike and the initial phase of a larger offensive. This is a weak assumption in a nuclearized environment where timelines are compressed.
A standoff strike on an airbase, ammunition depot, or command node cannot be evaluated in isolation when decisions are made in minutes rather than hours. To the state being attacked, the object of attack is not the declared purpose of the attacker but the risk of follow-on operations. It is challenging to interpret political signalling where there is a little time.
In these circumstances, ambiguity increases the risk of escalation. Speed diminishes the effectiveness of diplomatic intervention, and standoff effects render the difference between tactical and strategic targets indistinct, especially when a command-and-control or deterrence-related capability is at stake. Thresholds are no fixed points that are unilaterally calibrated by the attacker. They are guided by the situation, choice of targets and how the defender’s perception of threat may follow. History shows that operations which are meant to be limited tend to spread when kinetic action commences, such as war in Korea, Vietnam and the current Russia-Ukraine Conflict
The Response and Crisis Stability
A rational Pakistani response lies in shaping posture to make Cold Strike less reliable as a crisis option, while reinforcing stability. This centres on three priorities: hardening, counter-ISR and preservation of decision space.
Hardening and dispersal reduces the chance of an opening strike to produce paralysis. Dispersed and camouflaged basing, layered and mobile air defence, redundant communications and frequent relocation of sensitive assets will ensure that no early strike can effectively neutralise vital capabilities. By reducing the pay-off of early strikes such measures play a direct role in crisis stability.
Counter-Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance is also important. Cold Strike depends on timely, accurate intelligence. Signatures jamming, false decoy, false mobilisation and active counter- UAS can weaken Indian sensing and targeting. By making decisions uncertain, these steps slow the decision cycle for the attacker and restore the time the Cold Strike is attempting to compress.
Preserving decision space is the most important consideration. The decision space itself becomes a form of deterrence during rapidly developing crises. By means of well-developed crisis communications; timely and transparent signaling; robust command system and correct early warning data, leaders can reduce the likelihood of decisions under duress. While technology has an impact on this process, operational clarity which will be more important for reducing the risk of unintended escalation in a rapidly developing crisis. War is inherently unpredictable. Most concepts that emphasize rapid action and packaged solutions tend to create crises that become increasingly difficult to manage or control. Therefore, Pakistan needs to reinforce credible deterrence, sustain the ability to endure high levels of pressure, and ensure that a developing crisis can be contained.
This article was published in another form at https://defensetalks.com/from-cold-start-to-cold-strike-indias-quest-for-limited-conventional-options/
Syed Ali Abbas is Research Officer & Comm Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) Islamabad. He is also an MPhil scholar in the Department of Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (NDU) Islamabad.
