NRC Reform & the American Nuclear Diplomacy in the Middle East

Today, nuclear energy is highly politicized issue in the Middle Eastern region. All the three great power the US China and Russia, see Middle East as a region with great economic potential and a growing need to diversify energy portfolio. A recent massive overhaul of the American Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)[1] demonstrates that the US is cognizant of this reality. It marks a significant development in American nuclear corporate diplomacy. The changes of the NRC are less focused on regulation and more on development and promotion of nuclear energy. Where it promises American strategic export competitiveness, it also risks undermining the regulatory credibility that had made the US stand out among the partners and had assured its geopolitical influence.[2]

Nuclear corporate diplomacy encompasses a strategic partnership. During the 60-80 years of operation of a nuclear power plant,[3] and the recipient state relies upon the host for technical knowledge, as well as components including fuel supply and administrative experience to the recipient state. For instance, Article 123 of the American Atomic Energy Act (AAEA) applies the nonproliferation norms in the US nuclear energy partnerships, such as the limitation of uranium enrichment. Through this symbiotic relation, the latter state becomes tied to the host for six to eight decades.[4] Depending upon the nature of the partnership, it also involves key macroeconomic decisions, such as the regulation of energy prices in the recipient state. A cursory look at the global nuclear energy landscape reveals that the US leads with 94 active nuclear power plants contributing 97 GW, followed by Russia’s 36 with 27 GW of input and China and France giving 55 GW and 63 GW, each with the same number of 57 power plants.[5]

The Middle East sees similar competition among great powers in nuclear energy, leading to three models of influence. First, the US nuclear partnerships are guided by Section 123 of the American Atomic Energy Act[6] and feature private-sector vendors, all overseen by the NRC’s strict regulations. The US has partnered with the UAE at the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant since 2009.[7] In contrast, Russia’s state-owned agency Rosatom uses a ‘build-own-operate’ (BOO) model.[8] Rosatom provides sovereign-backed loans that pay for over half the cost of nuclear power plants.[9] Its flagship project is the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant in Egypt. China also forms strategic partnerships focused on infrastructure. The China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) has several MoUs with Middle Eastern countries and runs the China-GCC Forum on peaceful nuclear technology use.[10]

The Middle East attracts global nuclear energy players, owing to its ever-growing energy demand, capital capacity, and geopolitical relevance. With the energy demand increase of about 1,000 terawatt per hours (TWh)[11] in last two decades, the region has become the third largest contributor to electricity demand.[12] Nuclear energy aligns with the long-term energy diversification strategies[13] of the broader economic transformation aimed at by the Gulf countries. It not only provides sustainable energy essential for energy-intensive sectors but also meets the global carbon neutrality commitments.[14] The affluent sovereign funds of six GCC states, amounting to $4.9 trillion,[15] also make them distinct in bearing the enormous cost of a nuclear power plant. Similarly, the crucial intersection of the region along the maritime security routes, excessive global oil and gas reserves, and defense cooperation with the great powers make the region more geopolitically relevant.

The recent NRC reform[16] in the US aims to alleviate the US nuclear energy export-competitiveness, due to long timelines and incompatibility with modern technologies. Through the passage of EO 14300, Trump announced the revision of all the rules and set deadlines for their implementation. The ordinance aims at accommodating the regulation of modern nuclear technologies and next-generation reactor variants. The EO underscores the need to buttress the export competitiveness and reestablish the US as a global leader in nuclear energy, which was earlier hindered by regulatory bottlenecks.[17] NRC, earlier, was focused on the gigantic light-water reactors,[18] taking multiple years in their authorization of licenses and inducing high upfront costs; whereas the Gulf states are considering next-generation reactor designs. The lag in US nuclear energy competitiveness resulted in the ageing of its nuclear fleet, with no active nuclear power plant construction as of yet.[19] Approximately 11.7 GW of its energy share will be reduced due to the reactor closures by the near-closure reactors[20]. Being a great player, the retirement of US reactors has a negative impact on American strategic dominance. Shrinking nuclear capability at home will erode the technological momentum needed for sustained leadership in the global nuclear energy landscape. Studies report 110 GW[21] of nuclear energy shortfall expected to grow up to 256 GW[22] in the future due to the decommissioning of various nuclear power plants across the globe.

Being a core component of its soft power, the regulatory credibility also makes the US a distinctive player in the growing competition in the Middle Eastern nuclear energy market. Experts argue that the possible enhancement of the Department of Energy (DOE) and American political administration in the NRC might undermine the independence of the NRC.[23] Novel complications in the draft rulemaking can confuse the roles of promoter and regulator, which do not align with the global nuclear best practices. The reported resignations of around 10 per cent of the NRC force since trump administration has taken charge [24] are likely to challenge American technical capacity that was already going to face a shortfall.[25] The rapidly changing scenario in the nuclear energy landscape of the Middle East represents a unique intersection of technical capabilities and nonproliferation norms. Amidst them, the revision of NRC conforms to the US nuclear energy vision, transcending its domestic sphere and becoming a part of foreign policy. It is yet to be seen if the NRC reset helps the US reclaim dominance in the nuclear energy landscape, where strategic partnerships determine the course of geopolitical alignments.

[1]https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-14300-ordering-the-reform-the-nuclear-regulatory-commission

[2]https://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senator-markey-blasts-trump-order-undermining-nuclear-safety-mission-of-nrc

[3] https://www.technologyreview.com/2024/04/04/1090630/old-nuclear-plants/

[4] https://www.technologyreview.com/2024/04/04/1090630/old-nuclear-plants/

[5] https://www.visualcapitalist.com/ranked-nuclear-power-capacity-by-country-2025/

[6] https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-international-security-and-nonproliferation/releases/2025/01/123-agreements

[7]https://www.uae-embassy.org/sites/default/files/2025-05/Embassy_One-Pager_Nuclear Cooperation_05.12.2025_V3.pdf

[8] https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/russia-nuclear-power

[9] https://thebulletin.org/2023/12/why-egypts-new-nuclear-plant-is-a-long-term-win-for-russia/

[10] https://www.gcc-sg.org/en/MediaCenter/News/Pages/news2025-4-21-3.aspx

[11] https://www.iea.org/reports/the-future-of-electricity-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/executive-summary

[12] https://www.iea.org/reports/the-future-of-electricity-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/executive-summary