The Indian lack of global commitments and its fragile domestic legally binding practices indeed raise a question mark on both the above globally binding mechanisms.
Once again, the Indian police have arrested unauthorized individuals in Bihar for the unlicensed possession of 50 grams of radioactive californium worth Indian rupees 8.5 billion or US$100 million. This is not the first time or one of the incidents in India that has grasped the spotlight. A continuous pattern has been observed in such occurrences in India. More than twenty cases have been reported repetitively on the smuggling of critical and objectionable material from India since the mid-1990s. These reoccurring patterns suggest two possibilities: a) lapses and loopholes in the Indian nuclear safety and security culture and the absence of a regulatory mechanism to govern nuclear and radioactive material; b) the possible existence of a black market in India where unauthorized movements take place constantly. This indeed raises a set of questions i.e., who are these individuals and why are they operating unauthorized? They could be people involved in a malicious intent to achieve their desired goals; b) involvement of an organized group of criminals cannot be overlooked in such activities who may be involved for their profitable and parochial gains through the transaction of such material without realizing the end-usage of it; three, a gang of terrorists may also be involved to procure such material to the preparation of radiological dispersal devices (RDD). The question here arises what are the RDD devices and what are the consequences of their use? RDD also known as dirty bombs comprised of radioactive material and conventional explosives. Rogue nations and/or terrorist groups can obtain these materials to assemble dirty bombs. Any lack of control over such material or unauthorized movement of critical radioactive material in the wrong hands by any dimension can lead to severe consequences.
The cost of a radiological attack would be more economic, social, and psychological. The main danger from the use of a dirty bomb comes from the explosion. The explosion can cause serious injuries and property damage. People nearby could be injured by pieces of radioactive material from the bomb. People who are very close to the blast site would be exposed to adequate radiation to cause immediate serious illness. However, the radioactive dust and smoke can blow out farther away and could be dangerous to health if people breathe in the dust, consume contaminated food, or drink contaminated water. People incapacitated by radioactive pieces or contaminated with radioactive dust will want urgent medical care. In a nutshell, it endangers the safety of people and exposes the environment to harmful effects by creating social disruption and anguish. Additionally, any unauthorized use of such material can create security risks in terms of strategic mistrust and misunderstanding between the nuclear weapons states taking the dynamics of strategic stability to an uncontrollable escalatory and uncontrollable level.
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) code of conduct on the safety and security of radioactive sources binds all the states to govern such material amicably and effectively. The IAEA code was reinforced to take account of international security concerns in the backdrop of the events of September 11, 2001. The text of the modified Code was endorsed by the IAEA Board of Governors in September 2003 and in resolution General Conference (GC) (47)/RES/7, and the IAEA hailed the Board’s approval. In this regard two supplementary Guidance documents were approved by the IAEA Board of Governors: Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources (approved in 2017), and in resolution GC(61)/RES/8 the IAEA General Conference, endorsed the Guidance while recognizing it is not legally binding, and called on all Member States to make a political commitment to implement the Code of Conduct and its supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources and to act by the Code and the Guidance. However, consistent patterns of reoccurrences over decades within nuclear weapons states i.e., India are a matter of grave concern.
Additionally, the United National Security Council Resolution 1540 also binds all states respectively for a stringent domestic monitoring system and regulatory control and implementation of robust safety and security culture ensuring that such material does not fall into unauthorized hands. The resolution demands all states to adopt and enforce stringent laws to govern such nuclear and radioactive material and ensure it is not used, in particular for terrorist purposes. In support of this resolution, an offshoot arrangement, the Security Council Committee was introduced and tasked to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the resolution at the state level. Through this offshoot arrangement, the Council extended the mandate of its subsidiary 1540 Committee until 30 November 2032. The Indian lack of global commitments and its fragile domestic legally binding practices indeed raise a question mark on both the above globally binding mechanisms.
Under the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a Waiver was granted to India in 2008, calling it a responsible nuclear weapons state. Such acknowledgment of India could not bind India to the implementation of global best practices under an independent regulatory mechanism. Although the Indian Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) has published its Mission Statement, the Safety Codes, Standards, and the Code of Ethics. The Indian AERB suggests that these policies and requirements for nuclear and radiation safety are generally in line with the requirements of the IAEA standards on ‘Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety i.e., IAEA GSR Part – 1 and the IAEA standards i.e., ‘Fundamental Safety Principles – IAEA-SF-1. However, the trajectory of reoccurring incidents of theft of radioactive material suggests contrarily.
Indian lack of control over nuclear and radioactive material suggests that India be pushed to introduce an independent regulatory mechanism that is opened to international scrutiny through regular peer reviews making sure that India does not become a hub of the black market for nuclear and radioactive material. A Security Council Committee should take the role of reviewing the Indian case regularly. In cooperation with the 1540 Committee and relevant regional and subregional organizations, i.e., the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) that also assists member states in their efforts to fully implement the key requirements of resolution 1540 (2004), including the preparation of voluntary national implementation plans, the conduct of 1540 Peer Reviews and identification of effective implementation practices. The UNODA should support the capacity building of the Indian government officials to effectively implement the obligations under the resolution as per its mandate. Overlooking Indian ungoverned radioactive and nuclear material will lead to unbearable regional and global security risks and consequences.
This article was published at https://www.nation.com.pk/30-Aug-2024/unregulated-indian-radioactive-material
Dr Rizwana Abbasi is on the faculty of NUML, a non-resident fellow of CISS, and a visiting fellow of the Central European University of Austria.
