The US president-elect Donald Trump has begun his second non-consecutive presidential tenure. This political development is going to have serious implications for the geo-political landscapes in almost every part of the world. Hardly anywhere across the globe the policy trajectory of the new US administration would reverberate more profoundly than in the Asia Pacific, a region where Washington has long sought formidable strategic dominance through formation of security alliances.
If Trump’s first stint of four years as a commander-in-chief of the world’s dominant economic and military power is any indication, his return would likely be an extension and replication of his first term, going to potentially shake up the fundamentals of the US relationships in the Asia Pacific region.
President-elect known for his transactional and zero-sum style of dealing with rivals and partners alike, sometimes at the expense of values, alliances, and even treaties, is likely to terrify Washington’s friends in the region. This political development may push its allies to become more independent by relying on intra-regional cooperation and seeking alternative alliances outside of Washington. Therefore, the US allies disenchanted with Washington’s dismissive attitude under Trump 2.0 may feel compelled to strengthen ties with other regional countries through independent bilateral or multilateral mechanisms. This is a diplomatic strategy of engagement Beijing has been employing for years.
Consequently, China is more likely to enhance its regional influence through a variety of strategic foreign policy approaches. Its first response may include a ‘new model of great-power relations’ with the US, characterized by a more measured and non-aggressive stance aimed at stabilizing the bilateral ties between the world’s two largest economies. Trump last month held a ‘very good’ phone call with his Chinese counterpart President Xi Jinping and both leaders have indicated readiness to collaborate despite differences over trade issues. China is sent its Vice President Hag Zheng to attend Trump’s inauguration. It was the first time a senior Chinese leader attended a US president’s swearing-in. It shows how China has been treading a careful path in maintaining smooth great-power relations.
Second, Beijing may advance a comprehensive peripheral strategy, strengthening ties with neighboring countries and fostering peaceful trade partnerships across Eurasia and Africa via its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Chinese model, therefore, is likely to succeed because it has avoided a direct confrontational approach to the US’s military strategy. Unlike the US, which has signed mutual defence pacts with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, China has won over regional states through trade ties.
With a cabinet full of ‘China hawks’, Trump 2.0 will likely continue its previous approach of unpredictability and unreliability, deepening concerns among US allies and partners in the Asia Pacific. Former Australian prime minister, Malcolm Turnbull, has aptly summarized the phenomenon in his article for Foreign Affairs. According to him, ‘If Trump returns to the White House in 2025, only the wilfully deluded could imagine that a second Trump administration would be less volatile and alarming than the first.’ Trump’s first term was marked by his advocacy for America to act as a normal country and then taking the lead in undermining globalization. He adopted a rather isolationist approach and looked with skepticism at US alliances and military commitments abroad. He heaped scorn on free trade agreements. This isolationist and anti-globalisation trajectory signalled waning US influence in the Asia Pacific and Washington’s declining interest in resolving issues there.
During his first term, he remained rigid in his policy of questioning the reliability and contributions of Washington’s allies and threatened to quit NATO over perceived imbalances in payment for the alliance. Shortly after his inauguration in 2017, he withdrew the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade deal involving many Asian states, signaling his dislike of multilateralism. He consistently questioned the fairness of mutual defense treaties with allies that rely on American military power. His aversion to globalism and multilateralism was more obvious when he did not even shy away from threatening the international organizations, like the United Nations and the World Trade Organization.
This new trajectory of US foreign policy is characterized by an inward-looking United States. The US electorate has been more eager than US politicians to reject the role of ‘world policemen’ for their country, a shift evident with Trump elected. This will have serious implications for the geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific, a region which is one of the most globalized part of the international trading system.
The outgoing Biden administration reinforced alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, including strengthening the AUKUS security partnership between the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom, and the Quad collaboration among the US, Australia, India, and Japan. Biden administration also enhanced relations with the Philippines and fostered closer ties between South Korea and Japan, two most critial allies of the US in the Asia Pacific. Additionally, bilateral relations with Vietnam were elevated under Biden. On the other hand, President Trump’s ‘ambiguity’ toward China and his demand from Taiwan to pay for its security have raised the risks of incidental war in the Asia Pacific. Trump’s transactional diplomatic mindset may likely affect the US allies’ perception of the US security commitments and prompt them to explore regional cooperation mechanisms, possibly with China, without the presence of Washington.
For instance, Japan seeks enhanced collective security arrangements with the US, given their growing interconnectedness, particularly in areas like command and control and defense industrial production. However, the Trump administration’s dismissive stance toward traditional US defense commitments prompted Japan to reinforce ties with other regional partners, such as Australia and the Philippines.
Japan is concerned that Trump’s plans to impose higher tariffs on Japanese goods could increase costs in already competitive markets, severely impacting Japan’s automotive industry in the US. Additionally, Japan might face indirect repercussions from rising US-China trade tensions, as its economy is deeply integrated into Chinese supply chains, with China remaining its largest trading partner. Trump’s threat to implement 60% tariffs on goods from China can have devastating impact on Japanese economy.
While dealing with South Korea, despite stationing 28,500 US troops in South Korea and giving a US nuclear umbrella guarantee, there is a possibility that Donald Trump could push for renegotiating the cost-sharing agreement between the US and South Korea that was signed in October 2024. According to European Council on Foreign Relations, Trump may demand not only more funding but also greater Korean investments in critical US sectors like semiconductors and AI.
He could also call for quicker adoption of export controls and economic security measures against China. This pressure for closer alignment with US policies, along with potential US threats to withdraw troops or reduce commitments in the region, would challenge South Korea’s traditional balancing act of maintaining good relations with both the US and China. In response to uncertain US involvement, South Korea has suggested it might pursue an independent nuclear weapons program to deter North Korea. South Korea fears being sidelined in future US-North Korea negotiations. Both South Korea and Japan are the largest trading partner with China and a part of BRI, they may drift closer to China in the future in the face of mounting US pressure by a leader with transactional diplomatic appearance.
For Australia, a nation that values alliances, democracy, and multilateralism, a second Trump term could pose challenges under a transactional leader who views allies more as freeloaders than partners. Issues surrounding alliance skepticism, trade, China, and the AUKUS agreement are likely to arise between the two nations. China and Australia, on the other hand, share an evolving relationship, characterized by strong economic connections and strategic collaboration. In recent years, political tensions have eased, leading to a rebound in trade and investment. In 2023, the bilateral trade volume between the two nations grew by 9.2%, reaching AU$326.9 billion (US$215.78 billion). But if the Trump administration puts tariffs up on China, the latter can push regional states to band together and resist the game Trump is starting through his escalation with Xi.
For a long time, these states have relied on the US for security and defense. However, regional minilateralism is now gaining traction in the the Asia Pacific. Even the Biden administration’s approach was centered around regional minilaterals and key Southeast Asian partners, rather than a broader multilateral strategy A second term under Trump is likely to further undermine any remaining multilateral traces in the Asia Pacific
This erosion will create significant limitations for Washington’s foreign policy, as regional allies may be unwilling to fully back its initiatives, aimed at countering China. South Korea, Vietnam and Indonesia have already hinted that they may not fully endorse the US strategy to contain China. Recent surveys also show that Southeast Asia is increasingly inclined to align with China, reversing long-standing preferences for the US in the US-China rivalry. With Trump’s isolationist tendencies reducing US involvement, a power vacuum will likely open in Southeast Asia—a void China is positioned to fill through its subtle yet multifaceted foreign policy approach briefly mentioned above, leading to more interregional cooperation without the direct involvement of the United States. Talking about the first arm of China’s foreign policy to maintain stabilized bilateral ties with the US, China has remained one of the top three largest trading partners of the US, after Mexico and Canada. The Trump administration has vowed to impose harsh tariffs on goods from these three partners. There is talk that the US Congress may withdraw ‘Permanent Normal Trading Relations’ from China – that is most favoured nation treatment – which will have dire consequences. It is because, China, on the other hand, also remains the largest trading partner of all four close US allies in the Asia Pacific, namely the Philippines, Japan, South Korea and Australia.
This article was published in another form at https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/politics-governance/trade-wars-and-broken-alliances-in-the-asia-pacific-amid-trump-2-0/
Mr Mobeen Jafar Mir is Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.
